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The end of Suharto 
21 May 1998 will go down in world history as the day when the bloody and despotic rule of Suharto 
came to an end. His 32-year rule made him Asia's longest ruler after World War IL He broke many 
other world records, as a mass killer and human rights violator. In 196511966 he was responsible for 
the slaughtt:r of at least half a million people and the incarceration of more than 1.2 million. He is 
also respon{iible for the deaths of 200,000 East Timorese, a third of the population, one of the worst 
. acts of genocide this century. 
Ignoring the blood-letting that accompanied his seizure of 
power, the western powers fell over themselves to wel-
come Suharto. He had crushed the world's largest commu-
nist party outside the Soviet bloc and grabbed power from 
President Sukarno who was seen by many in the West as a 
war-mongering, pro-communist leader. 
Anti-communism and stability 
Many in the West believed in the domino-theory, which 
held that all Asian countries would fall into communist 
hands. Hence the fall of Sukarno was seen as a triumph. It 
is a public secret that the CIA and MI6 contributed sub-
stantially to the communist witch-hunt and the subsequent 
downfall of Sukarno. Within hours of taking over the 
command of the Indonesian armed forces in October 1965, 
Suharto set about constructing a virulent anti-communist 
regime which attracted international support. His claim to 
have foiled an alleged 'communist coup attempt' provided 
his regime with one of its pillars of legitimacy. 
Once he had been officially installed as president in 
1967, development aid started pouring in. Even after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the international community contin-
ued to support Suharto's rule. But in the past three years 
the enthusiasm for Suharto began to erode. 
Suharto's other pillar of legitimacy was stability which 
he was able to guarantee by means of harsh repression, 
with the help of the military. For many years foreign in-
vestors were grateful for this, turning a blind eye to the 
lack of fundamental freedoms like freedom of association 
and speech. But stability began to disintegrate during the 
early 1990s when workers' protests and land disputes be-
came daily events. In the face of popular resistance, brutal 
military oppression became increasingly ineffective. 
In the last two years, other forms of social unrest took 
hold: assaults on local police, fury against the privileges 
From the editors: We apologise for the late arrival of 
this issue. Suharto's downfall had obvious conse-
quences for the production of this issue. We hope to 
· catch up in the coming .months. 
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enjoyed by transmigrants from Java or Madura. anger of 
local businesses unable to withstand competition from 
modern super-markets. In many instances. these turned into 
anti-Christian and anti-Chinese ri ots. The hallmark of the 
Suharto regi me \vas no longer stabil ity but instability, 
making it a liability for foreign investors. The ultimate ex-
plosion occurred a week befo re he stepped down when 
large swathes of Jakat1a · s Chinatown were reduced to rub-
ble. Thousands of Chinese famili es fled the country. The 
army stood by as gangs of provocateurs took over the 
streets. 
l\·lea1m hi le in cit ies and tO\vns across the coun try, tens 
of thousands of students \vere out in force , demanding that 
Suharto must go. With the economy in deep crisis and a 
power vac uum at the top, market forces made it clear that 
Suharto ' s rule was no longer sustainable. 
Crisis of legitimacy 
The crisis in Indonesia took on biblical proportions. A 
number of catastrophes came together. The political crisis 
which had been simmering for years; the cyclical El Nino; 
the disastrous man-made forest fires and the economic 
free-fall, all contributed to Suharto 's crisis of legitimacy. 
The political crisis dates back to July 1996 when the 
POI headquarters which was occupied by supporters of 
Megawati Sukarnoputri was attacked by hired thugs and 
police units on 27 July I 996, severely damaging Suharto's 
image. Peaceful rallies were met with brute force. The gen-
eral public exploded in anger and Jakarta was plunged into 
the worst protests and riots since I 965 . From then on, In-
donesia lurched from one crisis to another. 
Gradually news about Indonesia shifted from the inside 
to the front pages, no longer soft news but hard news. Arti-
cles began to appear everywhere about the Suharto dicta-
torship : about nepotism , human rights violations, about 
East Timor. From being the darling of the West, Suharto' s 
Indonesia was now a pariah state . When the economic cri-
sis hit Indonesia, it became clear to everyone, at home and 
abroad, that Suharto was the problem. 
In January 1998, nineteen members of UPI, the highly-
respected Indonesian Academy of Sciences, called on Su-
harto to step down, defying regulations that civil servants 
must not criticise the government. Then a group of high-
profile women civil servants took to the streets with the 
same demand. These two seemingly small incidents piled 
on the agony for the despot. 
But as history shows, dictators never depart gracefully. 
Even when it was clear in March this year that his days 
were numbered, Suharto insisted on being 'elected ' by his 
hand-picked MPR for a_ seventh term and appointing a 
cabinet of cronies, including his daughter Tutut. His arro-
gance shocked even his most Joyal devotees. 
Suharto and the Orde Baru 
Suharto ' s Orde Baru began with a massive bloodbath in 
1965 followed by many massacres during the next 32 
years. The Orde Baru started off as a military regime with 
Suharto as the leader of the junta. But the military junta 
disappeared swiftly as he removed generals once they had 
managed to build their own power base. 
In the seventies, attempts were made by top-ranking 
generals to create a rotating system of executive power but 
by then Suharto's power base was beyond control. In 1980 
a group of dissident officers set up Petisi 50, one of the 
first organised opposition groups. But this was also the 
beginning of the Suharto regime proper. From that moment 
on, the Orde Baru regime and the Suharto regime became 
synonymous. A vertical line of power was consolidated. 
Everyone given a top position became totally dependent on 
and subordinate to Suharto. 
Republic of fear 
The hallmarks of the Orde Baru were depoliticisation 
and fear. The few political freedoms inherited from the 
authoritarian Guided Democracy period of Sukarno were 
dismantled . All basic freedoms were snuffed out and the 
doctrine of the 'floating mass' was introduced. This as-
serted that the rural masses were too ignorant to get in-
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volved in politics as this would only disrupt development. 
The slaughter and mass arrests of 1965 inculcated an at-
mosphere of fear which persisted into the nineties. As ac-
tivists often said, fear had become a part of Indonesian 
culture. 
The main instrument of repression was KOP KAMTIB, 
the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, 
created by Suharto early in October 1965. Military com-
manders at all levels were invested with special powers to 
arrest people and control political activities. This was the 
Indonesian version of the Gestapo, 
but integrated into the army struc-
ture. 
The politics of the eighties wi!I 
go down in Indonesian history as 
the dark ages. Suharto set out to 
bulldoze everything suspect. In the 
name of Pancasila, the state doc-
trine, the entire country was forced 
to comply. The political system 
was forced into a strait-jacket cor-
poratist model. Monoloyalitas was 
the buzzword and every citizen 
had to take a Pancasila course. 
Like Hitler before him, Suharto 
wanted to create a new kind of 
Indonesian super human being. It 
took a great deal of courage in the 
eighties to be a dissident. Just or-
ganising an discussion group could 
result in a prison sentence of up to 
years. 
POLITICS 
In the mid eighties large parts of East and Southeast 
Asia were obsessed by 'Asian tiger' hype. It started with 
the exploitation of cheap labour, producing consumer 
goods for the global economy. But by the early nineties, 
Asian export-oriented economies like Indonesia moved 
into more risky ventures. A casino economy emerged, with 
capital being invested in high risk projects like real estate 
As we know from Orwell's 
1984, states like Suharto's Orde 
Baru cannot last long. Demokrasi 
A new coalition of women's organisations calling for Suharto to be sacked. 
Pancasila was nothing less than a regime based on fear, 
without democratic space, and as such, it became increas-
ingly inept. Suharto's demise means the demise of the 
Orde Baru but it could take several years before some of 
the structures disappear. The holding of free elections 
scheduled for 1999 should accelerate the process of con-
signing the Orde Baru to the scrap-heap of history. 
EkonomiNKK 
According to received wisdom, Suharto rescued the 
Indonesian economy from the ruins of the Sukarno regime. 
The Sukarno government left an external debt of US$2.5 
billion and spiralling inflation. Suharto has left an external 
debt of around US$ l 20 billion; the economy is expected to 
contract by 15 to 20 per cent this year and inflation could 
exceed I 00 per cent. As for the rupiah, it now stands at 
14,500 to the US dollar as compared with 2,400 last July. 
Worse, when Suharto took over, Indonesia's forests' and 
natural resources were still intact. Suharto's legacy is a 
crippled Indonesian economy, natural resources have been 
squandered, along with irreversible ecological damage. 
When Suharto took over, the West and its multilateral 
institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, hardly waited 
for the bodies of the slaughter victims to be disposed of 
before showering the Indonesian economy with aid. For 
more than 30 years, an inhumane and unjust social-
economic system enjoyed the unstinting support of the free 
world. Every year, IMF and World Bank economists 
heaped praise on Indonesia's robust economy. 
and petrochemical plants or making a fast buck by specu-
lating in shares or in the foreign currency market. The flow 
of foreign capital seemed unlimited, foreign bankers were 
only too eager to throw billions of dollars at the Indonesian 
economy, lending to Indonesian conglomerates that were 
as empty as inflated balloons. 
This casino economy was combined with Ekonomi 
NKK (Nepotism, Corruption, Collusion) run by the Suharto 
family. Anyone wanting to do business in Indonesia had to 
take on board one or other of the hundreds of companies 
owned by the Suharto offspring. One analyst has made a 
tally of 1,247 corporations within the Suharto business em-
pirt~. The web of corruption is only now coming to light 
while the free fall of the economy is still far from over. 
Suharto and ABRI 
Over the years Suharto's relationship with ABRI has 
become much more complex. Until the first economic cri-
sis struck in 1973/4 when the state oil company, Pertamina 
had to be bailed out of US$ I 0 billion of debts, military rule 
was ~ncontrolled. The Dwifungsi (dual function) military 
doctrme penetrated everywhere. Suharto and his generals 
ruled over Indonesia as if it was their private fiefdom. State 
corporations were used as milk cows; on retirement, every 
general would be rewarded with a forest concession or a 
juicy busine~s deal. ~~t gradually, things began to change. 
The nat10nal poht1cal and economic cake became too 
small to go round. An entrepreneurial class of ABRI offi-
cers did not emerge. Unlike Thailand where top-ranking 
officers became part of the economic elite, ABRI generals 
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were told to concentrate on military professionalism. orn-
cers lik~ lbnu Sutowo and Thahir. who had amassed for-
tunes from running state companies, became a thing of the 
past. Senior officers were reduced to making extra earnings 
from mafia practices. or extorting protection money from 
the emerging Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurial class. 
While it proved relatively easy to keep ABRI out of big 
business, it was not so easy to keep them out of politics. By 
the early nineties, Suharto had discarded his most loyal 
generals, even men like Ali Murtopo who had stage-
managed the 'act of free choice' in West Papua and intro-
duced the 'floating mass' doctrine, or Benny Murdani who 
had commanded the invasion of East Timor. From now on, 
top posts in ABRI were reserved for family members like 
Wismoyo Arismunandar and Prabowo Subianto or former 
adjutants. But the apex of the pyramid of officer postings 
had become so thin that it was impossible to satisfy every-
one and ensure solid ABRI loyalty towards Suharto. 
The emergence of factions in ABRI, with different de-
grees of loyalty meant that, even though the top generals 
were hand-picked by Suharto, loyalty was no longer auto-
matic. As protests spread throughout the country, Suharto 
became a beleaguered man, no longer knowing who he 
could trust. 
Like all dictators, he tried to cling to power to the bitter 
end. In the end, his top generals were the ones who realised 
that Suharto had become a liability and persuaded him to 
stand down because they were no longer able to contr~l .the 
situation. For the top brass, maintaining their o~n po.ht1_cal 
(and economic) privileges had become their pnonty. 
Maintaining the Dwifungsi without Suharto bec;ame the 
solution. 
The last days of Suharto 
There are several accounts of the sequence of events be-
fore and after Suharto's fall. They read like thrillers, full of 
suspense., with events swirling round an aging dictator 
who had lost all sense of reality. 
As the political crisis was reaching its climax, Suharto 
decided to attend a conference in Cairo, wanting to show 
he was still in control. Back home, the crisis lurched from 
bad to worse. Tens of thousands of students were demon-
strating in force in campuses right across the country. 
On 12 May, four students were shot dead at Trisakti 
University, Jakarta, during a peaceful demonstration. These 
deaths sent shock-waves across the country as students 
came out in even greater numbers, flying flags half-mast 
and saying prayers for the dead. 
The day after the killings, riots broke out in Jakarta, 
devastating the main commercial centres, gutting shopping 
malls and vehicles. Suharto was forced to cut short his 
visit. He returned to a different country. The rioting in Ja-
karta had left the country in a political vacuum. Instead of 
coming out to protect the victims, the army had done 
nothing. It was not until weeks later that investigations re-
vealed that more than a thousand people had died in the 
infernos, while scores, perhaps hundreds, of Chinese 
women had been systematically gang raped. Evidence is 
now linking the riots to army factions that helped organise 
the mayhem which wrecked the system of food distribu-
tion, making economic conditions even worse. 
While in Cairo, Suharto hinted that he might be pre-
pared to step down and play the role of lengser keprabon, 
an elder statesman guiding things from behind, like other 
authoritarian Asian leaders, Ne Win in Burma and Lee 
Kuan Yew in Singapore. His statement was met with scep-
ticism; student demonstrations continued to demand that 
Suharto should resign and should go on trial. By then it 
was clear that Suharto's demise was just a matter of time. 
As Indonesia's best known writer Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer said: "I was not at all surprised. Suharto was no 
longer a force for determining the process of change. He 
was like a small stone that could be kicked around by the 
feet of the students" [Washington Post, 7 June 1998]. 
While Suharto tried to save his presidency, the three 
days of rioting had convinced even his staunchest follow-
ers that it was time for him to go. Different cliques within 
the regime came up with their own scenarios. On J 8 May, 
with the Parliament building under siege by thousands of 
students, Harmoko, one of his most loyal lackeys and chair 
of DPR/MPR (Parliament/People's Congress), stunned 
everyone by announcing that that it would be better for 
Suharto to resign and announcing that impeachment proce-
dures would be started if he failed to do so. A few days 
earlier, his house in Solo had been gutted by an angry 
crowd. A few months earlier, this same Harmoko, as chair 
of the ruling party GOLKAR, had proclaimed to every-
one's astonishment that: "After making a check throughout 
the country, it is evident that the Indonesian people still 
want Suharto as President". Harmoko's vault over the 
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fence was spectacular but not exceptional. He was just one 
of the many rats leaving the Titanic. 
But Harmoko's thunderbolt was greeted with a public 
slapdown by General Wiranto who said that Harmoko's 
proposals were 'illegal and unconstitutional'. 
Constitutionalism rules the day 
On the same day, 18 May 1998, real moves began on 
how to ditch Suharto. The buzz word was konstitutional, a 
typical concept of the Orde Baru .wh~re constit~tionalism 
is form with no substance. Everythmg m Indonesia must be 
constitutional: if you want to slap a heavy sentence on a 
human rights activist, just find a suitable article in the 
criminal code. The Orde Baru legal system was never 
based on the rule of law and the division between the three 
powers was non-existent. Everything had to be done ac-~ 
cording to the law (konstitutional). In the end, Suharto re-
ceived the same bitter medicine he had applied to his po-
litical enemies. 
By now student demon~trations had. spr.ead. from ~he 
campuses onto the streets with everyone JOmmg m. Am1en 
Rais had announced that he would bring out one million 
people in Jakarta on 20 May, National Awakeni~g Day, 
and no one doubted this could happen. But the mght be-
fore, a top general, undoubtedly General ~iranto, pho~ed 
him with a warning: 'Go ahead and you will have a Tien 
An Men on your conscience.' 
The rally was called off. It could not have happene~ 
anyway as the streets leading to the huge square where it 
would have taken place were seated off by hundreds of 
tanks (including many British Scorpions) and tens of thou-
POLITICS 
sands of troops. On 20 May, the heart of Jakarta was under 
siege by the Indonesian army. Later that day, Amien Rais 
angrily accused the army of state terrorism. 
By now Suharto's position was hopeless. He negotiated 
with key members of his crony cabinet who told him to 
resign. He conferred with the top brass who told him the 
situation had become uncontrollable. He asked for advice 
from nine key Muslim leaders who told him bluntly to step 
down. In the meantime, the four factions in parliament, 
including ABRI, had decided that Suharto should step 
down. 
Habibie, an historic accident 
It was General Wiranto who emerged as the constitu-
tional fixer. He consulted seven constitutional experts for 
their views on possible successions. Should it be Amien 
Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah, or a reform council of 
mainstream opposition figures that would hold new general 
elections? The third possibility was to hand over power to 
Vice-President Habibie. It became clear that for ABRI, the 
third option was the most attractive, even though their pas~ 
conflicts with the man were legendary. They could not 
control Amien Rais or a reform council; Habibie would be 
much easier to control as he lacked a power base. 
When this alternative was presented to Suharto, he gave 
vent to serious doubts about Habibie's abilities (even 
though he had chosen the man to be his vice-president). 
This was all the more reason for Wiranto to opt for Habibie 
because the · era of Orde Baru tanpa Suharto (New Order 
without Suharto) was now taking shape. 
Early on 21 May, a forlorn Suharto announced his res-
ignation and his decision to hand over to Habibie, as his 
daughter, Tutut, stood weeping in the background. Habibie 
took the oath of office after which Wiranto grabbed the 
mike to say that ABRI would protect the person and the 
interests of the dictator who they had just deposed. 
Many people in Indonesia still have to get used to the 
idea that Suharto is no longer in charge. More than half of 
the population are under 30 years of age and have only 
known Suharto as President. Yet ironically, they were the 
ones who sounded the death knell for a dictator who had 
wrought such damage on a vast and beautiful country like 
Indonesia. ® 
continued from page 7 
With the economy in such dire straits and literally thou-
sands of businesses and banks technically bankrupt, vul-
tures are ready to pounce, foreign investors eager to buy up 
companies at bargain prices. Only democratic institutions 
in Jakarta and in the regions will be able to put the demo-
cratic process on the right track. 
Last but not least, there is the military, now playing for 
time while it heals its own divisions. General Wiranto has 
pledged support to the Habibie government and some of 
his henchmen suggest that they are considering taking a 
'back-seat' role. Popular democratic institutions will be 
essential to prevent a new strongman from emerging or, 
still worse, a military take-over. • 
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First impressions of the post-Suharto era 
Rudy Habibie as President? Few people, including himself, ever imagined such a thing. Analysts 
call it an historic accident. The new President can hardly be called a politician. He has no reform 
programme and his notion of economics has been described as 'bizarre'. Most people see him as the 
pawn of his predecessor, chosen more for loyalty than ability. Students are already demanding that 
the Habibie family fortunes should be investigated and that he should stand down. 
After only a few weeks in the job, Habibie has been 
forced to admit that he is just a transitional figure. He has 
said repeatedly that he will stay on as president until the 
next elections and has no intention of standing then. The 
economic crisis and · political upheavals are obviously too 
much for the aeronautics engineer. His cabinet is much the 
same as Suharto ' s final cabinet, minus some of the more 
glaring cronies. It 
can hardly be 
called a team and 





nesia needs a new 
government with a 





presidency is little 
more than an his-
toric accident [see 
also article on Su-
harto's downfall] , 
the economic melt-
down is helping to 
keep him in power. 
Other mainstream 
candidates like Amien Rais, Megawati and former cabinet 
minister Emil Salim know only too well that taking over 
the reins of government in a period of economic crisis 
could damage their chances in the forthcoming elections. 
The other option would have been to create a council or 
Presidium of people with impeccable reputations, to func-
tion as a transitional government. This was the preferred 
option for the more radical groups in the pro-democracy 
movement but the appointment of Habibie stage-managed 
by General Wiranto pushed this off the agenda for the time 
being at least. 
Another possibility was for Habibie to dump the cabinet 
he inherited from Suharto and set up a Reform Council 
composed of leading reform advocates, but most leading 
opposition figures rejected this as it would have meant 
supporting Habibie who is so closely identified with the 
Suharto regime. 
It is a fact of life that any new Indonesian government 
will need the overwhelming support of the people, other-
wise it will be impossible to steer the country out of the 
economic quagmire. Any unpopular economic measure can 
Financial Times, 8 June 1998 
only be successfully 
implemented if peo-
ple believe that the 
government has a 
clear alternative 
economic strategy 
that is based on 
promoting the inter-
ests of the common 
people and not big 
business and the 
foreign bankers. 
There is no one 
promoting such a 
strategy at the mo-
ment. The IMF and 
the international 
community know 
very well that their 
strategy will involve 
highly unpopular 
measures that 
Habibie will not be 
able to deliver. In-
deed, unpopular 
measures forced on 
Suharto by the IMF in May were a major contributory 
factor to his downfall. 
Democratic space 
With Suharto out of the way, there is plenty of demo-
cratic space. Political parties have been set up, quickly 
turning Indonesia in a multi-party system. The Habibie 
government has little credibility and everybody realises 
that his government will not last beyond the next elections. 
The power vacuum has created unlimited possibilities 
for political freedoms. The press, until recently so tightly 
controlled, is now enjoying unprecedented freedom. People 
in the regions [see separate article] are taking matters into 
their own hands, staging sit-ins in provincial government 
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buildings and demanding the sacking of corrupt officials. 
After more than three decades, freedom of expression has 
suddenly become a reality. Everyone speaks as if Orde 
Baru has been already been transformed into Orde Refor-
masi. 
Four-star General Wiranto decided to opt/or Habibie as 
President 
In the meantime the structures of the Orde Baru are 
disintegrating. Golkar, the ruling party, has now split three 
ways. The Muslim party, the PPP, has fallen apart while 
the POI wing that was backed by the government has lost 
its legitimacy and its headquarters have been taken over by 
Megawati supporters. Other bastions of the old regime, the 
governors and district chiefs, are being targeted by the 
people. One of the first to fall was Colonel Sri Roso 
Darmo, the district chief of Bantu!, in Y ogyakarta, who 
was dismissed following massive demonstrations. He ruled 
over Bantu) like a fiefdom and tolerated no dissenting 
voices. He is also held responsible for the murder of Fuad 
Muhammad Syafruddin, in August 1996, the journalist 
who fearlessly exposed his misdeeds. 
The weak Habibie government is unable to define the 
boundaries of political space. For the time being at least, 
everybody, including ABRI, the armed forces, has to show 
that tjhey are advocates of reform. For the first time in al-
most ' forty years - since before Sukarno's 'guided democ-
racy' - leftist politics, labour activism, democratic reform-
ers human rights campaigners, feminist activists and re-
gi;nal campaigners, are able to campaign freely and 
openly. 
Delegitimisation 
The fall of Suharto also means the beginning of the end 
of the Orde Baru. But this does not mean that old struc-
tures will disintegrate automatically. While some political 
POLITICS 
structures withered away in days, others will need to be 
eradicated by positive actions and legislation. 
Most people agree that the 1945 Constitution will need 
major changes or will have to be replaced. There can be no 
place any longer for the military doctrine Dwifungsi. Orde 
Baru history books will have to be rewritten, especially 
their version of the events in 1965 and Suharto's seizure of 
power. The Pancasila indoctrination courses will have to 
end. The legal system will have to be drastically over-
hauled, restoring the independence of the judiciary. 
On a more practical level, de-Suharto-isation is hap-
pening every day. Members of the DPR and the MPR, Par-
liament and the People's Congress, all appointees of the 
Suharto era, are beginning to resign, under strong pressure 
from all sides. Those who have already taken the hint in-
clude the wives, sons and daughters of highly-placed offi-
cials and army officers. It remains to be seen whether the 
Suharto clan will follow suit. As we write, rumours abound 
that the middle son Bambang and the oldest daughter Tutut 
want to retain their positions in GOLKAR. 
Some members of the Habibie cabinet such as Interior 
Minister Lt. General Syarwan Hamid, are having to endure 
daily protests because of their murderous behaviour during 
the Suharto days. The Information Minister, Lt-General 
Yunus Yosfiah, has been seriously implicated in the mur-
der of five television journalists in Balibo, East Timor in 
October 1975, incurring a protest from the New York-
based Committee to Protect Journalists. 
Hardly anybody defends Suharto and Orde Baru these 
days. Almost everybody has left the sinking ship, behaving 
as if they had always been reformers. To be seen as one of 
the Suharto gang is now a huge liability. Even some rela-
tives of the former dictator are trying to extricate them-
selves, proclaiming that their business empires had nothing 
to do with any Suharto connection. 
The economic tailspin 
While the political thaw has brought a sense of eupho-
ria, there is deep disquiet with the economic wreckage in-
herited from Suharto. The economic collapse remains the 
major stumbling block for real reform in Indonesia. The 
Asian crisis has forced three leaders out of office, in South 
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. But while in the first two, 
the political crisis was resolved by the succession, the 
Habibie succession has resolved neither the political nor 
economic crisis. The dark side of Indonesian society could 
emerge in different forms. 
One imminent danger is another wave of anti-Chinese 
riots [see separate article]. Smaller outbreaks of rioting and 
looting have already erupted, disrupting the fragile eco-
nomic distribution system and creating more hardship for 
the population. 
Some analysts worry about the eventual break up of In-
donesia, ·a nation-state of many islands and ethnic groups. 
Indonesia which did not exist as an entity before the Dutch 
brought the islands together, was held together during the 
Orde Baru not by nationalist fervour as in the Sukarno 
days but by iron-fisted and heavily centralised control, kept 
together by ABRI. A future Indonesia will need to grant 
full autonomy to the regions, allowing local people to de-
cide how to deal with their natural resources and handle 
their economic and social affairs. continued on page 5 
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Glodok revisited 
A week after three days of rioting in Jakarta, President Habibie made a high-profile visit to Glodok, 
the centre of Chinatown in Jakarta. The usually busy and thriving business and shopping centre was 
in ruins. His call for an end to racism has been met with cynicism. Instead of promising better pro-
tection by the security forces, the new President suggested that the Sino-Indonesians form their own 
vigilante squads for self defence. 
The three days of rioting in Jakarta from 13 till 15 May 
resulted in I, 188 deaths. According to preliminary findings 
by Komnas Ham, the National Commission of Human 
Rights 40 large shopping malls, 4,083 shops and 1,026 
private homes were attacked, burned or looted. 383 offices 
and banks were gutted plus 1, l I 9 vehicles. Places like 
Medan and Tanjung Balai in North Sumatra and Solo in 
Central Java were also heavily affected by riots. 
Some analysts estimate direct losses of US$ 900 million 
in Jakarta alone. It will be difficult to assess the indirect 
losses resulting from the interruption of business activities. 
The impact on the distribution of food and industrial goods 
is immeasurable. The destruction of Glodok and Mangga 
Dua, the main Jakarta shopping and business centres, is the 
worst incident since the birth of the Indonesian Republic. 
In previous anti-Chinese pogroms, Glodok and Pasar Pagi, 
as Mangga Dua was fonnerly known, were left unscathed. 
They were seen as being untouchable because of vast 
amounts of protection money Chinese businesses paid to 
the military. But in a collapsing political system, nothing 
can be taken for granted. 
It is also symbolic that the private home of Liem Sioe 
Liang, Indonesia's richest businessman and close associate 
to Suharto was attacked and destroyed by the angry 
masses. A platoon of Kopassus elite troops who guarded 
his home day and night fled. 
Stage-managed 
Several groups have been monitoring the three horrific 
days, Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan (Voluntary Team 
for Humanity) and two women's groups Kalyanamitra 
and Mitra Perempuan. Large-scale anti-Chinese po-
groms have in the past been organised by third parties. 
Tim Relawan, run by the popular Jesuit priest Romo 
Sandywan, has identified certain patterns in the attacks 
and subsequent looting and burning of the shopping 
malls and concluded that they happened in a systematic 
and professional way. 
It started by taking a crowd to a certain spot and 
spreading the news that people were looting at shopping 
mall X. The atmosphere was further fuelled by burning 
tires and wood nearby. Then a group of people would ap-
pear to incite the crowd to join in the looting. The groups 
were variously described as youngsters with student or 
high school accessories such as university jackets or tough-
looking types with crew-cuts, military types or muscular 
men with body tattoos. After inciting the crowd 
Looting is the name of the game 
with anti-Chinese yells, they remained outside while the 
crowd got on with the looting. 
In several cases the youth groups arrived in trucks or 
mini buses and started fires with molotov cocktails or wet 
towels soaked in kerosene. Targeted shopkeepers later 
testified that their shops already had been daubed with 
three letters BMC (Basmi Milik Cina, Destroy Chinese 
Property) on the shopwindows. 
Full investigation needed 
Demands for a full investigation about the riots are 
growing. With much greater freedom of the press, many 
reports have spoken of the possibility that anny units were 
involved in mastenninding the riots. Amien Rais, a leading 
opposition figure, wrote an emotional article in the political 
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weekly Adil, after meeting hundreds of Sino-Indonesians at 
the Cengkareng airport in Jakarta. Most had been victim-
ise? and were desperately trying to leave the country. He 
wntes of the traumatic experiences of many Sino-
Indonesians during those days. Such was the press cover-
age that President Habibie felt obliged to call on ABRI to 
carry out a thorough investigation. He said: "/particularly 
ask the armed forces leadership to reveal the truth over 
allegations that an organised group was seen inciting peo-
ple to burn and loot buildings in several areas where dis-
turbances occurred' [Jakarta Post, 12 June 1998). 
So far the army leadership has 
declined to comment. Commander 
in chief Wiranto has dismissed 
speculations that ABRI personnel 
were behind the riots . as a way to 
justify their security and order role. 
In the past three decades, violent 
incidents were often provoked by 
ABRI, so as to then come forward in 
the name of security and order. 
Small and big business 
The Glodok district has been a 
busy shopping district since Dutch 
times. In the evenings, the district is 
flooded with crowds of shoppers, 
milling round food and clothing 
stalls in the many small streets, a 
scene that can be replicated in many 
Southeast Asian cities. Most of the 
trade is in the hands of small and 
medium-size traders, who work long 
hours to earn a living. Many stories in the press are heart-
breaking. Thousands of small shopkeepers have lost eve-
rything. With the exception of the new high rise depart-
ment stores and super markets, none of the Glodok mer-
chants can be described as rich . Glodok is located in the 
old heart of Jakarta, also known as Kata, the traditional 
Chinatown. Big business has long since moved elsewhere. 
Rioting and burning also occurred in other suburbs. The 
Jakarta neighbourhood patterns are very similar to any 
mega-city, slum areas cheek by jowl with middle-class ar-
eas and posh neighbourhoods. Shopping malls are often the 
only meeting place between the two; some go to spend and 
others to gaze at goods they cant afford. Places like Y ogya 
Plaza in Klender, Jatinegara Plaza in Jatinegara, the shops 
at the Kampung Melayu bus terminal and Mall Puri Indah 
in Kebon Jeruk are located close to densely populated, 
poor urban neighbourhoods. The economic meltdown has 
made such places extremely volatile. 
The head offices of the conglomerates are situated in a 
new area, the Golden Triangle around Jalan Sudirma,n and 
Jalan Gatot Subroto. This is where big money circulates 
and all the important economic transactions are made. 
None of these high rise buildings were affected by the ri-
ots. 
Although some turmoil could have been predicted as the 
end of Suharto approached, no one could have foreseen the 
extent of the rioting. Back in March, as Suharto was being 
're-elected', many Sino-Indonesians left for short holidays 
to Singapore, Hongkong and Australia while the more 
wealthy ones were transferring capital abroad. The small 
shopkeepers in Glodok were not well-enough endowed to 
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do this. When the riots started, the big Sino-Indonesian 
conglomerates were beyond the reach of the rioters. 
Structural reforms 
For many years the Orde Baru was like a paradise on a 
vulcano. Sooner or later the vulcano would explode. An 
unjust and inhumane system was nurtured by a small group 
of people around Suharto and his family. This includes 
Matahari Department Store in Solo in flames. Looting and 
destruction was huge in Solo, comparable to the inferno in 
Jakarta 
major business groups run by Liem Sioe Liong (Sudonc, 
Salim), Prayogo Pangestu (Phang Djun Phen) and The 
Kian Seng (Bob Hasan), while others benefited from the 
system. Instead of slowly building a just society, the Orde 
Baru became a system based on grabbing, robbing and 
looting. When the vulcano did burst there was nothing left 
but decay and bankruptcy. With a few exceptions all the 
big conglomerates have collapsed. They were not based on 
sound economic policies but on favouritism, monopolies 
and easy lending. 
There have been several periods when so called pribumi 
(indigenous) businessmen got special treatment. It was 
tried in the fifties and the seventies with woeful results. In 
desperation Suharto summoned the conglomerates and told 
them to commit a percentage of their profits to the scheme 
but nothing worked because of nepotism, corruption and 
collusion. The small traders never stood a chance. The rate 
of extra levies, much of it paid to the army, is estimated at 
around 30 per cent of production costs. Only big business 
can cope with such a burden. No wonder supermarkets and 
department stores, practically all owned by Sino-
Indonesians and the Suharto clan, were the target of the 
angry masses all over Indonesia. These were the companies 
that had destroyed the livelihood of many small traders. 
A future Indonesian government will need to pave the 
way for the development of a new merchant and industrial 
middle class, providing legal protection through anti-trust 
laws, anti-corruption laws and laws to promote small · and 
medium-sized businesses. 
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A crowd attacking the !tome of Liem Sioe Liong, Suharto's 
closest business associate. 
The silent minority 
Racism against the Sino-Indonesians is nothing new 
and has existed since the Dutch period. In those days, some 
Chinese traders grew prosperous _while the indigenous 
population remained at the bottom of the social ladder. 
During the Dutch period Chinese were segregated into 
Chinatowns and restricted to certain professions like run-
ning pawnshops. 
Inequality and economic hardship often provide the 
base for social jealousy and racist attitudes. While in 
neighbouring Southeast Asia, tensions between the locals 
and Chinese have eased in the last three decades, the racist 
policies of the Orde Baru have only exacerbated the situa-
tion. The other countries have also benefited from the rise 
of an indigenous middle class, which hardly exists in Indo-
nesia. 
Illegal levies have a strong racist element. Sino-Indo-
nesians are likely to have to pay more for public services 
like passports and ID cards. They are for ever having to 
show proof that they are Indonesian citizens while those 
who adopted Indonesian names are required to show their 
naturalisation papers. In many regions, Sino-Indonesians 
carry have a special code in their JD card, WNI which 
stands for Indonesian citizen. It has become second nature 
for most Sino-Indonesians to be silent and pay up. Shop-
keepers or company-owners are constantly being pestered 
for money by officials, military or local maffia gangs. 
Structural racism starts already with the Indonesian 
Constitution which states that the President of the Republic 
must be orang Indonesia asli (an indigenous Indonesian). 
Structural racist policies [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 146, 
April 1998) have affected the minds of the average Indone-
sian. The restrictions on Sino-Indonesians finding jobs out-
side commerce are taken for granted. 
Slogans daubed on victims' houses like: "Chuck the 
Chinese out of Indonesia" or "Cina PK!" are a reflection 
of racist state policies. It has driven the Sino-Indonesians 
into becoming economic animals with hardly any social-
political outlet (which hardly ex.isted in the Orde Baru). 
The Sino-Indonesians have increasingly become a silent 
minority. 
New political parties 
The recent anti-Chinese rioting has ended 
the silence of the Sino-Indonesians. In the last 
few weeks two new political parties have been 
set up. Partai Reformasi Tionghoa, the Indone-
sian-Chinese Reform Party, want to narrow the 
gap between the pribumi and non-pribumi and 
see themselves as part of the Indonesian people. 
Parti uses the _term Tionghoa instead of the de-
rogatory Cina, which was foisted on the coun-
try by the military after 1965. 
Parpindo (Partai Pembauran Indonesia, the 
Indonesian Assimilation Party ) is, as its name 
suggests, strongly assimilationist. In the early 
sixties a group of right-wing Sino-Indonesians 
propagated the concept of total assimilation. 
They wanted to deny their ethnic background 
and advocated total immersion with the 
"Indonesian race". These were the people who 
that promoted the idea of people giving them-
selves Indonesian names. While elsewhere in 
the world, multi-ethnic society has been gaining 
ground, Indonesia's Orde Baru was set on implanting the 
totalitarian concept of creating a single Indonesian identity. 
This new party, like its predecessor, wants to put a halt to 
multi-ethnicity in Indonesia. 
Committee against Racism 
Probably more interesting than the two parties is the 
emergence of a Committee of Indonesian Youth for the 
Eradication of Racial Discrimination. This new group will 
fight alongside the victims of discrimination, raise public 
awareness and prepare a class action against the govern-
ment for failing to protect its citizens. It will also urge the 
government to ratify the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and 
introduce new anti-discrimination laws. A plan of action 
has been designed, including assistance to the victims. This 
initiativ~ enjoys the s~pport of a broad range of people. 
The chair of the workmg group is Esther Yusuf, a lawyer 
from LBH, the legal aid institute. Former student activist 
Enin Supriyanto is also one of the founders. • 
East Timor's 
Unfinished Struggle 
Inside the Timorese 
Resistance 
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Sexual abuse used to terrorise minorities 
Shocking reports have been made public about the mass raping of scores of Sino-Indonesian women 
during the riots that devastated much of Jakarta's Chinatown from 13 - 15 May. From the evidence 
being pieced together by women's groups, a picture of well-organised assaults against women is now 
emerging. One activist has described it as 'state-sponsored violence' against women. 
It has taken weeks for the extent of the tragedy to 
emerge, largely because so many of the women attacked 
are still too traumatised to. talk about their experiences. 
Dozens of women are now in psychiatric hospitals, suffer-
ing from mental disorders caused by the tragedy while 
many are known to have committed suicide rather than 
face the humiliation they suffered from what happened to 
their bodies. 
Suffering in silence 
Some of the first revelations were made during church 
services when witnesses felt emboldened to speak out. 
During one service at a church in west Jakarta, an Indone-
sian women stood up and asked for forgiveness for not 
coming forward earlier to report what she had seen in her 
street. 'She described how a mob surrounded a house with 
two Chinese women inside and said if they did not come 
out, the house would be burnt. But the women preferred to 
die rather than be raped by the mob so they stayed inside 
and were burnt alive. It turned out after the service that 
almost everyone had heard similar stories.' [The Guardian, 
4 June] 
Ita Nadia who chairs Kalyana Mitra, a women's aid 
centre which has carried out much of the investigations, 
said that for many of the victims, death would have been 
preferable. 'Their experiences have cast a shadow over 
every second of their lives and the tears falling from their 
mournful eyes are unstoppable'. Some of the attacks went 
beyond rape and abuse. 'A man told us that his wife's at-
tackers mutilated her genitals with a razor blade after first 
raping her.' Another man told how his teenage sisters were 
raped by at least seven men. The r~pists then. threw them 
into the fire which they had started m the family home, Ita 
said. 
One young woman had a lucky escape after her taxi 
was stopped by a mob in the middle of the night on 14 
May. She was forced out and ordered to undress in front of 
the crowd. 'Then a man pushed through the crowd, pulled 
me out and gave me Muslim clothes to wear, the woman 
recalled.' [Jakarta Post, 10 June] 
The reports indicate that girls as young as ten were 
raped. Some women were gang-raped in front of crowd~ in 
the commercial district of Glodok. 'Some of the rapists 
said: "You must be raped because you are Chinese and 
non-Muslim."' The consensus among human rights work-
ers and rape counsellors is that the attacks were mostly 
organised by unknown groups, in th~ s~me way ~hat the 
arson and looting were deliberately mstlgated. Witnesses 
spoke about men with muscular builds and military hair-
cuts and one woman said she had been raped by men who 
' 
had a military uniform in their car. [International Herald 
Tribune, 11 June] 
An example which has been described in several reports 
tells of passengers on a bus being separated along ethnic 
lines. The Chinese women were told to get out, take off 
their clothes and walk. They were herded towards bushes 
lining the road. The good-looking ones were raped while 
the others were told to march on naked. In another inci-
dent, a group of ten men entered a bank and sealed the 
door. Inside the Chinese women were ordered to dance 
without clothes on. 
Organised violence 
All the evidence suggests that the rapists were not local 
people or neighbours who were entering shops and looting. 
Rather, they were organised gangs of men operating in 
groups of five or more. Some descriptions of the men sug-
gest that they may have been from the military but pin-
pointing individual rapists is proving extremely difficult. 
In an interview with Radio Netherlands, Ita Nadia said: 
'The acts were well-planned and carried out like a military 
operation. The men would come to a certain place, loot 
shops and then rape the women, something which is very 
common in military situations.' Speaking for the women's 
groups conducting the investigations, she said 'Our targets 
are not the guilty individuals since it is difficult to produce 
evidence, but we want to raise the awareness and solidarity 
of the public. Society itself will have to militate against this 
kind of injustice. These assaults were carried out system-
atically, not by any single individual.' 
Kalyana Mitra activists have themselves been intimi-
dated. On one occasion recently, they received a packet 
containing a hand grenade, with the message: 'There will 
be more to come.' 
Speaking of her organisation's work since it was estab-
lished ten years ago, Ita Nadia said: 'We have been dealing 
with rape cases for ten years but we have never encoun-
tered anything quite as barbaric as this. The victims ask for 
protection because they fear reprisals if the details of their 
cases are revealed.' 
She pointed to a political message: 
'If you want reforms and democracy, there is a price 
you have to pay. They want to create a state of terror in 
order to intimidate people so they pick on ethnic Chinese, 
on women and non-Muslims because they are the most 
vulnerable. We are extremely angry that women are being 
targeted and subjected to sexual violence as a means to 
intimidate people. This is state-sponsored violence. ' 
[Interview with Radio Netherlands, the English translation 
of which was published on the Internet on 16 June] $ 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 147, July 1998 11 
SOCIAL UNREST 
Social upheaval in the regions 
During tlte mass actions to get rid of Sultarto, most reports focused on what was happening in Ja-
karta with lrnrd(r any mention in tlte international press of events taking place elsewhere. In many 
places ltuge crowds took to tlte streets calling for Suharto's resignation and drastic reforms. Local 
demands were also raised. From Medan in tlte west to Ambon in the east, people demanded auton-
omy and called for corrupt officials to be sacked. 
Comparisons can be dram1 with the so-
cial re\'Ol ution that erupted in 19..+5 after the \ 
defeat of Japan . In those days too. there \Vas 
a pO\\er \'acuum in a number of places in the 
young republic. In 19-+5. district chiefs \vho 
collaborated with the Japanese or Dutch 
\\ere being ousted . Today. corrupt. power-
hungry officials are being targeted by the 
people. 
All over Sumatra. from Aceh [see sepa-
rate a11ic le] in the no!1h to Lampung in the 
south. people took to the streets in huge 
numbers. Jn many places they occupied the 
local assembly and other government build-
ings. as well as local state radio or television 
stations. These actions are still continuing in 
many places. 
These day~. Jhe Indonesian press is ful I of 
repo!1s about such local actions. so much so 
in fact that it trfipossible to do justice to the 
extent of the upheavals . On this occasion, 
due to lack of space, we have decided to give 
1 
our readers little more than a taste of what 
Action i11 Medan. The banner says: Sack Suharto and put /rim on trial! 
has been going on . Hopefully, regional action groups will 
produce more comprehensive accounts in their own publi-
cations. 
Actions before 20 May 
Jn April a consensus had been reached between groups 
throughout the archipelago that action against the Suharto 
regime would reach a climax on 20 May, National Awak-
ening Day commemorating the 9oth anniversary of the 
emergence of the first Indonesian nationalist movement 
against Dutch colonialism. By that time, local actions had 
been going on for weeks. 
The 19 May issue of Media Indonesia gives an impres-
sion of the range of local activities: Students in Semarang, 
the capital of Central Java, had · occupied the local state 
radio station and the governor' s office. Some 2,000 stu-
dents from the Universitas Bung Hatta in Padang, the 
capital of West Sumatra, had occupied the local assembly. 
Members of the assembly, including the chairperson, had 
to flee the building after refusing to sign a charter calling 
for comprehensive reform for the whole nation . The stu-
dents had vowed not to leave the building until the local 
authori ties accepted their Total Reformation Plan . 
In Bandung, the capital of West Java, tens of thousands 
of people went to the local assembly to present similar de-
mands. Jn front of the local assembly building a free 
speech podium was erected for use in the next few days. In 
front of ITB, the Bandung Institute of Technology, a simi-
lar free speech podium had been installed where students 
and lecturers mingled and held discussions about the cur-
rent crisis. 
In Ambon, the capital of the Moluccas, actions had 
been going on for several days. Demonstrators marched to 
the local assembly and then to the governor's office where 
Governor Latuconsina was forced to listen to the reform 
demands of the people. They also called on the governor to 
stop the uncontrolled fishing of waters surrounding the 
Moluccas because big corporations and corrupt officials 
were the ones to benefit from such exploitation. The stu-
dents also demanded the revocation of forest concessions 
which had all gone to influential people in Jakarta. They 
complained that these concessions were destroying the 
tropical forests while local people gained nothing. 
Also on the same day, Media Indonesia reported that 
thousands of students from the state university, USU, in 
Medan, the capital of North Sumatra, were continuing to 
press for a full explanation about the shooting of three stu-
dents. This related to an incident three days earlier, during 
a mass action, when students spotted a military intelligence 
agent taking photos of students. When he produced his 
identification documents and they realised who he was, the 
students started chasing him off the campus. But suddenly 
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other military personnel opened fire , injuring three stu-
dents . 
In Lampung, South Sumatra some 5,000 students dem-
onstrated along with more than 200 lawyers . They deliv-
ered two wreaths to the local parliament, one to mourn the 
death of the four students at Trisakti University in Jakarta 
and the other to symbolise the death of parliament. The 
newspaper reported that whereas in the past few months, 
serious clashes had occurred between students and the se-
curity forces , on this occasion there were no conflicts. In 
Pekanbaru, also in West Sumatra, there was a public debate 
involving 3,000 students, the university rector, the local 
authorities as well as the city ' s military and police com-
manders. In West Java, demonstrations were held in Se-
rang and Tasikmalaya demanding total political reform . 
Events on 20 May 
While the people power demonstration which was to 
have taken place in Jakarta had to be cancelled in the face 
of military threats [see article on Suharto' s demise] , in 
many other places, the streets were filled with people tak-
ing part in peaceful protests. 
The military doctrine DW/FUNGSI in reality 
The national, parliament in Jakarta, situated on the out-
skirts of the capital, continued to be occupied by tens of 
thousands of students. Even though only students were 
·involved the occupation acted as a rallying point for peo-
ple in Jakarta and elsewhere from all walks of life. 
The most impressive show of people power occurred in 
y ogyakarta, Central Java, where almost one millio~ people 
took part in a peaceful march to the centre of the city, con-
verging from all directions, including tens of tho~s~nds of 
people from the countryside. People from other c1t1es, Se-
marang, Magelang, Klaten, Solo, Purwor~jo and elsewhere 
took part in the Yogya rally, along with the Sultan of 
Yogya, Hamengkubuwono X. 
ABRI absent 
The organisation which was in the hands of a number of 
political and social-religious organisations proceeded very 
smoothly even though such a huge crowd had gathered. 
People assembled at twelve assembly points. Many of the 
groups marched for several hours but not a single s?op was 
attacked. Shop owners also unfurled banners saymg: We 
support Reform. Some banners ~ead : Yogya i~ ready to t~ke 
over as capital. This was a reminder that durmg one per~od 
of the independence struggle when Jakarta was occupied 
by the Dutch, Yogya became the capital of the Republic. 
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The most interesting feature of people power in Yogya 
was that the security fo rces were nowhere to be seen. They 
stayed in their barracks with the result that the huge rally 
was peaceful from beginning to end. 
People power in the other places was also very impres-
sive. In Semarang a few hundred thousand people held a 
rally which ended in a free-speech forum with speakers 
demanding the resignation of Suharto and total reform. 
In Surabaya, the capital of East Java, tens of thousands 
of people took to the streets, but on this occasion, the secu-
rity forces decided to step in. As a result, thirty people 
were injured, ten vehicles were destroyed and a hotel was 
ransacked. 
In Pekalongan, Central Java, thousands of students 
joined by the general public marched through the city; they 
then occupied the local assembly. A similar thing happened 
in Medan, the capital of North Sumatra, involving tens of 
thousands of demonstrators. Smaller actions along the 
same lines occurred in Blitar, Pasuruan, Jember, Tuban, 
Situbondo, Kediri and Jombang, in East Java, as well as in . 
the cities of West Java, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, Cirebon, Su-
kabumi, Cianjur, Bogor and Krawang where huge crowds 
poured onto the streets. 
Never before in the history of the 32-year old Orde 
Baru regime had people showed such a united commitment 
to the demand for the removal of Suharto and total reform. 
It was this peaceful mass action that struck the final blow 
at the Suharto regime. $ 
continued from back page 
Muslim prisoners 
According to lists published in June by Amnesty Inter-
national and Human Rights Watch, there are thirty Muslim 
prisoners, all of whom are serving very harsh sentences 
including eleven life sentences, and most of the rest, up-
wards of 14 years. There has been no mention by anyone in 
government about their chances of amnesty. Most were 
arrested in the mid 1980s. 
West Papuan and Acehnese prisoners 
Nor has there been any mention, officially, of what is 
likely to happen to these prisoners. According to AI/HR W 
lists, there are twenty-three West Papuans, most of whom 
are serving very harsh sentences. NGOs in Jayapura be-
lieve that the figure is much higher than this because of the 
number of people in local prisons. 
The Acehnese behind bars according to AI/HR W total 
no fewer than fifty-five, the largest single group of all. 
Most of their sentences are upwards of fifteen years. 
Given that these prisoners are deemed to be 
'separatists', they too may have to wait for a post-Habibie 
era before enjoying the freedom that is rightfully theirs. 
The sinister hidden force behind the promised amnes-
ties is of course the armed forces. Without the green light 
from them, neither Habibie nor Muladi are likely to move.* 
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'Disappearance' victims speak out 
Several activists who disappeared earlier this year into secret military torture centres took the bold 
decision to speak out after they were released and returned home. Their revelations contributed 
greatly towards further discrediting the Suharto dictatorship in the months leading up to Suharto's 
downfall. At least nine of the 'disappeared' have still not been accounted/or. 
The armed forces clearly hoped to instil terror in pro-
democracy activists in the months preceding Suharto's re-
appointment to a 7th term in March, by kidnapping people 
and whisking them off to secret locations. 'Disappearance' 
has long been a form of abuse in East Timor. Its re-
emergence in Indonesia was a sign of desperation on the 
part of Suharto and ABRI as opposition grew in intensity. 
At least a dozen activists were made to 'disappear' in 
early 1998 in addition to five people who 'disappeared' in 
the run-up to the general elections in May 1997. This does 
not include more than a dozen people who are still unac-
counted for following the armed attack on the POI head 
office in Jakarta on 27 July, 1996. 
It was the decision of Pius Lustrilanang, 30, general-
secretary of SIAGA, the solidarity forum to support Amien 
Rais and Megawati Sukarnoputri and a member of the pro-
democracy group, Aldera, who disappeared on 3 February 
after visiting a friend in hospital, to go public that stunned 
public opinion in Indonesia. Before he resurfaced, he had 
been warned of dire consequences by his captors, against 
himself or against those still being held in the same secret 
location. Three weeks after returning home to his parents in 
Palembang, he went to Jakarta, reported what had hap-
pened to the National Human Rights Commission, Kom-
nasHAM, held a well-attended ,press conference and left 
immediately for the Netherlands where his revelations 
were widely reported by the media. Within days, he was on 
his way to Washington to testify before a US Congres-
sional sub-committee and his account became front-page 
news in several major US publications. 
Domestic and foreign pressure 
As soon as a pattern of 'disappearances' emerged, the 
abuse was given wide coverage in the national press. Sev-
eral groups and individuals, especially the playwright 
Ratna Sarumpaet, coordinator of SIAGA, campaigned hard 
to force the security forces to divulge their whereabouts 
and release them. Foreign governments also expressed 
concern. Few people were taken in by professions of inno-
cence by the then army's chief-of-staff, General Wiranto, 
who denied that any army units were under orders to kid-
nap people. His official spokesman, Brigadier-General 
Wahab Mokodongan, even mocked the victims, alleging 
that they are probably 'wandering around in the jungle'. 
The matter was also raised at the UN Human Rights 
Commission meeting in Geneva in April where an earlier 
victim of this kind of abuse, Hendrik Dikson Sirait, pre-
sented testimony on what happened to him when he was 
kidnapped in August 1996 by a still-unidentified army unit 
and tortured, after attending a court hearing of a case 
brought by the Megawati-led PDI. Hendrik's Geneva ap-
pearance led members of KomnasHAM to warn publicly 
that Indonesia could be censured by this UN agency. All 
this forced ABRI to order the unit involved to release some 
of their captives. 
Pius Lustrilanang in Amsterdam 
The nine who are still unaccounted for are: 
Her?1an Hendrawan, a. student activist, who disap-
peared m March after attendmg a press conference at the 
Legal Aid Institute, YLBHI, in March this year. 
. Petrus Bima Angerah (Bimo ), a PRO activist, missing 
smce March 1998. His parents reported him missing to the 
police on 12 April. 
Suyat, a student activist and member of the PRO stu-
dent organisation, SMID. He went missing after being ar-
rested in Central Java in February 1998. 
Yani Avri (Rian), missing since 26 April 1997 after 
being taken into custody during the parliamentary ele~tions 
for allegedly planting a bomb. 
Sonny, also missing since 26 April 1997. 
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Dedi Ham dun, who went missing on 29 May 1997, the 
day of the parliamentary elections. He is a businessman 
and supporter of the PPP, one of the three parties officially 
permitted to contest the elections. 
Ismail and Noval Alkatiri have also been missing 
since 29 May. 
Mochamad Yusuf has been unaccounted for since he 
went missing in Jakarta on 7 May 1997. 
Pius Lustrilanang has confirmed that Sonny and Dedi 
Hamdun were held at the same place as him and fears that 
they inay now be dead. 
Terrifying experience 
Lustrilanang was seized in a busy Jakarta street, forced 
into a vehicle with a pistol held in his back, immediately 
blindfolded and hand-cuffed. As he alighted one hour later, 
unsure of where he was, one of his captors barked: 'There 
are no human rights here, no law. What you must do is an-
swer all our questions.' Throughout his time in captivity, 
whenever his blindfold was removed, his captors wore 
masks so he was unable to identify anyone. 
On arriv'al at the detention and torture centre where he 
was to spend the next two months, he was immediately 
given electric shocks. His most frightening experience 
came later that day when he was plunged into a tub of wa-
ter reaching up to his chest. When the level reached his 
nose, the men kicked his head under the water for a few 
moments and pushed it down again repeatedly. Pius later 
wept as he described this, saying he really believed he 
would never survive. 
All he could say about his place of detention was that 
he was held in one of six small cells, each holding one per-
son. With the passage of time, he was able to make voice 
contact with the others and discover their identities. A 
camera was constantly trained on each cell. He remembers 
hearing low-flying aircraft for several hours every morning 
and late evening, suggesting that he was near an air-base. 
At three every afternoon, he heard a trumpet sounding for 
roll-call. The men handling him always wore masks so he 
only saw their eyes. They also wore heavy raincoats mak-
ing it difficult for him to judge their size. The men bringing 
his food changed every two days and he reckons there 
were at least fifteen men involved. Very loud music was 
played all day and for most of the night, probably to pre-
vent any noises from inside the centre reaching the outside 
world. 
On his last day in captivity, he was summoned by an of-
ficer and told that he would get another shot of electricity 
as a 'souvenir'. They gave him a new set of clothes and 
packed him off to the airport with a ticket to Palembang. 
While at home, he received a number of phone-calls 
every evening warning him not to go to Jakai1a or tell the 
press about what happened to him. With his family's sup-
port, he finally decided to take the risk and go to Jaka11a to 
tell his story to the world. 
Kopassus was probably in charge 
It is clear from Lustrilanang's account that the unit in 
charge was highly professional and very well equipped. 
Pius said: 'The men involved were not just ordinary sol-
diers. They were well-trained in terrorising people.' This 
lends credibility to the suspicion that Kopassus, the special 
forces command, well-experienced in intelligence activity 
and the use of torture and for long associated with 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Prabowo, Suharto' s son-in-law, was responsible for the 
'disappearances ' . 
US investigative journalist, Allan Nairn, is quite certain 
that the abductors were from Kopassus. From interviews 
with Indonesian army officers and US embassy personnel, 
it has emerged that the abductors were from its Group 4 
unit, which has kept in close liaison with the US embassy 
in Jakarta. Colonel Chairawan, commander of Group 4, 
told Nairn that he liaises regularly with Col Charles McFe-
tridge, the Defence Intelligence Agency attache at the US 
embassy who was aware throughout of the abductions and 
their perpetrators. It was only after public protest mounted 
that the State Department put pressure on Prabowo to re-
lease some of the 'disappeared'. 
SMID leader also tells all 
One of the top leaders of the People's Democracy Party 
(PRO), Andi Arief, who escaped arrest in 1996 and went 
into hiding, was captured b~ unidentified men on 28 March 
1998, while staying with his sister in Palembang, South 
Sumatra. He was rushed to Jakarta and incarcerated in the 
same centre as Pius. He resurfaced nineteen days later but 
not as free man; he was handed over to the Jakarta police 
on 17 April and is almost certain to face charges soon. 
Andi is from the PRD's student organisation, SMID. 
Andi's experiences were made public by his father and 
elder siblings who met him at police headquarters in Ja-
karta after he re-emerged. He told them he was handcuffed 
and blindfolded, with a pistol aimed at him throughout the 
journey by ferry to Java and then the one-hour trip from 
Merak to the place of detention. Once there, his hands and 
feet were both cuffed, with an extra cuff chaining his legs 
to the table. This meant he couldn't move around even to 
pray or go to the toilet. 'They treated him like a dog,' said 
his sister, telling him to urinate into a tin can. 
She says he was not tortured but had pistols trained on 
him all the time, sometimes as many as eight. 
After being delivered into the hands of the police on 17 
April, the police claimed that he had been in their custody 
right from the start, a claim vigorously denied by Andi 
Arief himself. His lawyers later told the press that Andi 
would refuse to collaborate in any interrogations, either as 
witness or suspect, until those responsible for his kidnap 
were called to account. 
He also said that one of his abductors told him during 
their journey from Palembang to Jakarta that he had re-
cently returned to Indonesia after completing a course of 
training in the UK. [See separate article on UK's relations 
with Indonesia.] 
Another of the men who went missing, Desmond Ma-
hesa, the director of the Bandung-based Legal Aid Insti-
tute, LBH-Nusantara, took some time before he was will-
ing to go public. Early on, he told the press, he had asked 
for a safety guarantee from the armed forces before agree-
ing to speak, saying quite frankly that he was 'dead sc;red' 
of what could happen to him. He would only confirm that 
his own experiences paralleled those made public by Pius 
L ustri lanang. 
But Haryanto Taslam. a deputy secretary-general of 
Megawati ' s POI, who also \vent missing for weeks. has 
refused to speak out of fear of the consequences for mem-
bers of his family. • 
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Ethical foreign policy in ruins 
The downfall of Suharto was accompanied by the demise of Labour's ethical foreign policy as com-
mercial interests held sway over ethics. British military equipment was used against defenceless stu-
dents, and Ministers outdid each other in their rush to avoid blame. But campaigners continued to 
demonstrate their support for those fighting against oppression and injustice. 
Two images will remembered in Britain from the end of 
the Suharto regime. They feature Foreign Secretary, Robin 
Cook. exchanging smiles and handshakes with the then 
President, and Scorpion tanks and water cannon on the 
streets of Jakarta confronting student protesters. Nothing 
more need be said to demonstrate the bankruptcy of British 
policy on Indonesia. 
The Cook report. 
The picture of Cook and Suharto appears in a remark-
able report, Human Rights 1998, published by the Foreign 
Office and Department for International Development on 
21 April. This glossy publication confirms that the ethical 
foreign policy is little more than a public relations exercise, 
devoid of substance. Bizarrely, it said the British govern-
ment had entered into a 'constructive partnership ' wi th an 
Indonesian regime, which will go down in history as one of 
worst human rights violators this century. 
Robin Cook and the deposed dictator 
The report contrasts starkly with the heavyweight US 
State Department annual human rights report, which runs 
into several hundred picture-free pages with critical reports 
on a large number of countries. 
Even as the report was published, British military 
equipment was being used to quell peaceful protest. The 
April front cover of the journal, D&R, showed a water can-
non spraying students from Gajah Mada University, 
Yogyakarta, Central Java. On 6 April, Forum Keadilan 
published a picture of a water cannon in use against stu-
dents on the UNS university campus in Solo, Central Java. 
On 8 April , Reuters reported that police in Surabaya used 
tear gas and water cannon to stop students leaving their 
campus during an anti-government protest. A witness said 
the water cannon used ' discoloured water that looked like it 
was from a septic tank, and the stinking water made dozens 
of others vomit and run away'. The Foreign Office later 
confirmed that yellow dye - presumably to assist the secu-
rity forces in identifying those involved - was used. 
Later, TV pictures showed water cannon and Alvis 
scorpion tanks being used on the streets of Jakarta by secu-
rity forces who had shot and killed four student demon-
strators . 
Ministerial hypocrisy 
Embarrassed Ministers embarked on a damage-
limitation exercise which involved blaming everyone but 
themselves. Robin Cook appeared on BBC Radio 4's To-
day programme to point out that the export licences had 
been granted by the previous administration, a fact former 
Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind attempted to deny on 
BBC 2's Newsnight. 
Foreign Office Minister, Derek Fatchett, won the prize 
for hypocrisy and duplicity, however, when he stated in the 
House of Commons on 19 May, 'I do not think that we 
shall hear from the Labour Benches ahy support ·for Su-
harto, the regime in Indonesia and the mistakes that have 
been made over the years.' 
This audacious U-turn in policy came after the Labo.ur 
Government had between May 1997 and March 1998, 
granted 52 arms export licences for Indonesia (the total had 
risen to 67 by June 1998) and refused only six, had allowed 
the sale of water cannon, armoured vehicles and Hawk air-
craft to go ahead despite its clear power to revoke licences 
that had been issued by the previous government, and had 
consistently supported the IMF bailout of the Suharto re-
gime at an estimated cost to the British taxpayer of $700 
million. 
The British Government remained committed to the 
Suharto regime to the bitter end because policy on Indone-
sia was driven not by ethics but by the perceived interests 
of British businesses, especially arms contractors and in-
vestors. 
16 TAPOL Bulletin No. 147, July 1998 
Arms sales and military training 
In 1996, arms sales worth £438 million accounted for 
half the UK's exports to Indonesia. The arms trade is sub-
sidised by the taxpayer through guarantees provided by the 
Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) of the De-
partment of Trade and lqdustry (DTI). It is also indirectly 
supported by the provision of military training and educa-
tion for army officers likely to be future power holders. 
Scorpion tanks in one of the main streets of Jakarta on 20 May 1998 
In April, the ECGD's cover for Indonesia amounted to 
£ 1,773 million, of which £848 million related to arms 
sales. The Government says it does not expect Indonesia 
to default on its loans, despite its severe economic difficul-
ties . With the likelihood increasing of Jakarta defaulting 
on massive foreign debt, the government has little reason to 
be so sanguine. Since 1990/91, the cost of military assis-
tance to Indonesia has been £3.57 million. 
ECGD cover for the Hawk deal alone is £531 million 
and delivery of the aircraft was due to commence in May 
1998. Two RAF officers are currently assisting the Indo-
nesian Air Force with the introduction into service of 
Hawk aircraft purchased in 1993. 
Three Indonesian military . officers are on training 
courses at the Royal College of Defence Studies, HMS 
Dryad, and the Joint Services Command and Staff College, 
Bracknell. 
Ten officers are attending a Masters of Defence Ad-
ministration course at the Royal Military College of Sci-
ence, Shrivenham provided by Cranfield University. A 
further eighteen army officers are enrolled at non-military 
educational establishments. Ten of those officers - seven 
of whom are from the special forces, Kopassus - are at Hull 
University on a security studies course in the 'theory and 
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practice of strategy and security form the perspective of the 
defence professional' . 
It is worth remembering that, until his controversial ap-
pointment as Vice-President and then President, B J 
Habibie headed Indonesia's military industrial complex 
and was responsible for the purchase of the Hawk aircraft 
from British Aerospace. 
Investments threatened 
Britain is Indonesia's largest foreign investor after Ja-
pan. Since 1967, direct im 1'stments have totalled $30.6 
billion. Even the economic meltdown may not have de-
terred British companies. In 1997 alone, investment com-
mitments amounted to $5.5 billion, and the UK tops the 
most recent list of investment approvals with $1.62 in-
vested in 23 projects from January to 15 May 1998. 
Major investors include Shell, BP, Rio Tinto, GEC, 
Thames Water, British Gas, National Power, Power Gen 
and Unilever. 
Following Suharto's downfall, many investments were. 
threatened by their association with the family of the for-
mer dictator. Under the system of patronage and 'crony 
capitalism' nurtured by Suharto, the extended first family 
and cronies acquired stakes - ranging from I 0 to 70 per 
cent. - in projects as joint venture partners by simply fa-
cilitating deals without providing any capital input. The 
family built up its wealth to levels estimated at anywhere 
between $10 and $40 bi 11 ion (the latter being just short of 
the $43 billion promised by the IMF to bail out the econ-
omy). 
This corrupt system, now popularly known as KKN -
Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme - is being targeted by the 
new overnment which is attempting to establish its re-
forming credentials. 
Companies affec(~d claim that they could not have done 
business without entering into corrupt deals. They were, 
however, fully aware of the political and economic risks 
involved and could have chosen not to invest Their collu-
sion helped to sustain the system for many years and they 
cannot now complain. 
A deal to supply water to half of Jakarta by Thames 
Water was threatened by the participation of Suharto's eld-
est son, Sigit. Following frantic negotiations - involving 
Derek Fatchett on a two-day visit to Jakarta at the end of 
May - the deal was saved by the formation of a new joint 
venture minus Sigit. 
A project to build a 60 km. toll road in West Java, in-
volving Trafalgar House (now owned by Kvaerner of 
Norway) and a company controlled by Suharto's daughter, 
Tutut, was initially suspended in September 1997 in re-
sponse to the economic crisis. The concession to build and 
operate the toll road may now be renegotiated because of 
Tutut's interest. Trafalgar House's future involvement is 
unclear. The project was partly funded under the British 
Government's Aid and Trade Provision and the taxpayer 
may lose several million pounds if Trafalgar House is ex-
cluded. 
PowerGen has been affected by both the political fallout 
of Suharto's downfall and the precarious financial position 
of the state electricity company, PLN. PowerGen has a 35 
per cent. stake, worth £400 million, in the Paiton II power 
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station project in East Java. One of the partners in the joint 
\ enture - known as PT Jaw a Power - is the Bimantara 
Group of Suharto· s son. Bambang. The contractual ar-
ranoements between PLN and PT Jawa Power became un-ten~le when the rupiah plunged against the dollar. PLN 's 
revenues from retail sales are set in rupiah whereas the 
power supply contracts are denominated in dollars. PLN is 
contracted to buy power at rates ranging from 5.74 cents to 
8.50 cents per kilowatt-hour. but now recoups only 1.9 
cents from its retail sales. The head of PLN has threatened 
to cancel existing power contracts. but it is more likely that 
thev will be re-negotiated. The Ministry of Mines and En-
ergy has said it will honour all existing contracts. 
Speculation also surrounds Rio Tinto's investment in 
the three-billion dollar Freeport copper and gold mining 
operation in West Papua. The Suharto family invested in 
Freeport through PT Nusamba, which is owned 80 per 
cent. bv Suharto-controlled charitable foundations and ten 
per cen't. each by Sigit and Suharto ·s crony, Bob Hasan. 
Other companies affected by links with the Suharto 
family and cronies include BP, Rolls Royce, British Aero-
space, Taylor Woodrow, GEC Alsthom, Bank of Scotland 
and United Biscuits. 
In the present political climate, the recovery of the 
wealth amassed by the Suharto family is a priority. But it 
may be the case that few companies will suffer in the long 
run as the Government is anxious to regain the confidence 
of foreign investors. British companies which remain 
should learn from the mistakes they made in supporting the 
Suharto regime for so long. 
In particular, companies must make a positive contribu-
tion to the political and economic reform process by 
avoiding corruption, by supporting their workers' right to 
freedom of association and their right to organise, by en-
suring that human rights are respected in their business 
operations, and by ensuring that their investments are of 
the highest quality in terms of their contribution to sustain-
able development. 
UK campaigning 
Campaigners in Britain were delighted by the fall of 
Suharto and those attending a demonstration outside the 
Foreign Office on 20 May even claimed some credit for his 
decision to resign the very next day! Several MPs attended 
the rally, including Ann Clwyd, Jenny Tonge and Alice 
Mahon. Most, however, are still cautious about future 
prospects and are committed to continuing their actions. 
Ironically, Habibie himself was one of the main focuses 
of the protest directed at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
in London on 4 April. A coalition of organisations con-
vened to deliver the message that peace, freedom and de-
mocracy are essential for economic and social develop-
ment. A vigil was held outside the conference centre and 
up to 2,000 demonstrators passed by on route to a rally in 
Trafalgar Square addressed by John Pilger, Carmel 
Budiardjo of TAPOL, indigenous representatives from 
Southeast Asia and members of the coalition groups. The 
day before, anti-arms trade activists unsuccessfully at-
tempted to make a citizen's arrest of Habibie, who was 
attending ASEM on behalf of Suharto. 
The Foreign Office demonstration on 20 May - Indone-
sia's Day of National Awakening - was held to express 
solidarity with the hundreds of thousands of Indonesians 
planning to rally to call for Suhart.o to stand do~n, a~d to 
mark the 9oth anniversary of the birth of Indonesia s m?e-
pendence movement. In the event, Muslim lead~r, Am1en 
Rais was forced to call off the rally when heavily-armed 
' ' . troops occupied and surrounded Jakarta s mam square. 
British Aerospace remains a primary target of ca~­
paigners. Many attended the AGM. in .London on 2? Apnl 
to make their voices heard both ms1de and outside the 
meeting. Two Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAA T) 
activists attracted most attention - including a front-page, 
colour picture in the next day's Independent - by climbing 
on to the roof of the nearby DTI building and unfurling a 
50 ft . banner, which read 'BAe Murder by Proxy'. Inside 
the meeting, the Board was challenged once again on the 
ethics of arming repressive regimes. 
Earlier, on Easter Monday, 13 April, three East 
Timorese exiles and nine Britons entered the British Aero-
space factory at Warton, Lancashire where th:y held a 
Christian liturgy to remember the dead of East T1mor. All 
twelve were arrested, but were later released without 
charge. At the same time a group of CAA T supporters 
launched a new campaign, Churches in Solidarity with East 
Timor (Ci SET), with the object of encouraging churches to 
become active on East Timor. 
Meanwhile, there will be no let-up in the campaign 
against arms sales to Indonesia. The 'Stop the Haw~s 
Coalition' has been renamed the 'No Arms to Indonesia 
Coalition' (NATIC) and will be launched at a meeting on 
28 July. Its primary purpose will be to facilitate the sharing 
of information on arms sales and on campaigns by member 
organisations. NA TIC hopes to produce a newsletter every 
three months. 
The campaign against military training has been di-
rected mainly at Hull University. A public meeting held at 
the University on 14 May revealed strong feelings against 
the presence of the Indonesians. A group of students have 
written to the Vice-Chancellor, demanding that no more 
Indonesian army officers be admitted. The issue has at-
tracted national press interest with articles and correspon-
dence in the Independent. The Association of University 
Teachers (AUT) has passed a resolution in support of 
members who refuse to teach the Indonesians. One mem-
ber of staff at the Royal Military College of Science, 
Shrivenham has said he will no longer teach Indonesian 
officers. 
Rio Tinto remains a focus of attention for many envi-
ronmental and human rights groups. Company practices 
were heavily criticised at the AGM in London on 13 May. 
Campaigners handing out leaflets drew attention to how the 
company 'dumps on human rights' with the aid of a strate-
gically-placed dumper truck. 
Shareholders who spoke at the meeting included a rep-
resentative from Indonesia who described how communi-
ties around the Kelian mine in East Kalimantan had been 
forced off their land, denied adequate compensation and 
has suffered from pollution caused by the mine. 
A leader of West Papua's Amungme community, Yo-
sepha Alomang, was also due to address the meeting about 
human violations by the military around the Grasberg 
mine, but the military prevented her from travelling to 
London. O 
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Army strikes hard at Timorese protest 
Several battle-hardened units of the Indonesian army brutally charged into hundreds of peaceful 
East Timorese demonstrators who had gathered in the forecourt of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry 
in Jakarta on 12 June and forced them to leave. The operation, which left many people wounded, 
came one day after President Habibie had called on the armed forces to show respect for human 
rights in dealing with disturbances. 
The Timorese who had assembled in Jakarta from 
towns right across Java and Bali had gathered on the 
premises of the Foreign Ministry, demanding to meet For-
eign Minister Ali Alatas or other senior ministry officials 
and hold a dialogue about a number of demands, focusing 
on the need for a referendum in East Timor. 
Demands 
In a three-page petition, the East Timorese described 
the invasion of East Timor as a violation of the Indonesian 
Constitution, meaning that Law No 7/1976 legalising the 
'integration' of East Timor was also unconstitutional. The 
Petition called for the repeal of this law and for the with-
drawal of all army personnel from the country and the re-
lease of all East Timorese political prisoners. 
It called on the United Nations to revise the tripartite 
format of talks under the UN's auspices, opening the way 
for representatives of the resistance to take part, especially 
the resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao and the two 1996 
Nobel Peace Prize laureates, Bishop Belo, SDB, and Jose 
Ramos Horta. The UN should urge Indonesia to make 
preparations for a referendum to test the views of the East 
Timorese, a UN office for human rights should be opened 
and a Special Representative for East Timor should be ap-
pointed to prepare for a referendum. 
It also called on the international community to halt the 
sale of all arms to Indonesia. 
Its final plea was addressed to the Indonesian pro-
democracy movement, to support the demands contained in 
the Petition and to recognise that a referendum for East 
Timor was an integral part of the total reform now being 
sought in Indonesia. 
Outnumbered by troops 
The action, organised by the East Tirnor National 
Youth Front, began at 8.30 on the morning of Friday, 12 
June when a huge crowd of Tjmorese ·occupied the fore-
court of the ministry. There were speeches by those present 
about the demands of the East Timorese. 
By mid morning, however, troops from the Marines, the 
Military Police, the army strategic command, KOSTRAD, 
and the cavalry, had arrived along with thirteen large trucks 
and started ordering the Timorese to leave. The many hun-
dreds of troops outnumbered the demonstrating Timorese. 
They pushed them back towards the iron railings, injuring 
many people. The operation grew increasingly brutal as 
troops started lashing out at the defenceless men and 
women with bayonets, truncheons and rifle butts. By 1.30 
pm, the evacuation had been completed and all the 
Timorese had been driven away to several locations. Alto-
gether 27 people had to be rushed to hospital, a number of 
whom were seriously wounded. 
An East Timorese demonstrator in Jakarta 
One Timorese activist and two Indonesians from a 
small support contingent were driven off to the Military 
Police headquarters in Jakarta for questioning. They were 
later released. 
International protests 
In a statement later that day, TAPOL said that although 
democratic space was being given to Indonesians calling 
for basic democratic reforms, 'occupied East Timor is still 
treated by the army as their special project.' It called on 
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the European Union to protest vigorously at this use of 
violence against East Timorese students and urged the EU 
to adopt a comprehensive decision on East Timar at its 
summit meeting in Cardiff three days after the brutality in 
Jakarta. 
Amnesty International expressed shock that a peaceful 
demonstration had been broken up violently. ·Just yester-
day. President Habibie called on the Indonesian armed 
forces to demonstrate their professionalism through respect 
for human rights in dealing with riots and demonstrations. 
Today. these same forces have forcibly broken up a peace-
ful political demonstration and detained the participants 
which is worryingly reminiscent of practices under the Su-
harto presidency,' said Amnesty. 
In Ireland, the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign 
urged the Irish government to summon the Indonesian am-
bassador from London (there is no Indonesian embassy in 
Dublin) to register its anger at the incident. 
Follow-up actions 
The security forces tried to force all the Timorese to 
leave Jakarta and return to their places of residence but 
more than four hundred defied these orders and took sanc-
tuary at a University of Indonesia campus in Depok on the 
outskirts of the capital and at the secretariat of the Catholic 
students organisation, PMKRI, in Central Jakarta. • 
East Timor: Is change in the air? 
Suharto's fall from power has removed one key obstacle to the resolution of the long-standing East 
Timor tragedy. But the army is still very much in control. East Timorese have used the democratic 
space available following the change in government in Jakarta to intensify demands for a referen-
dum while international clamour for change has mounted. So how soon can things begin to move? 
It has been acknowledged for years that an act of self-
determination in East Timor would never happen until Su-
harto fell from power and that any successor government 
would have to confront East Timar as its main foreign 
policy headache. Now that we have the 'New Order with-
. out Suharto', slight shifts are perceptible. The issues that 
Habibie, Suharto's chosen successor, must now confront 
are: the release of resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao and 
other political prisoners, the status of East Timar and an 
end to the atmosphere of fear which would require the re-
moval of Indonesian troops from the territory. 
Early on, President Habibie made what he hoped would 
be seen as a conciliatory move, saying that his government 
Xanana Gusmao in Cipinang prison, with young Timorese 
visitors 
would grant 'special status' to East Tim or within the Re-
public. The offer was brushed aside by Bishop Belo in Dili 
and resistance leaders abroad as meaningless. 
On 18 June, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas presented new 
proposals to the UN to resolve the issue 'once and for all'. 
These were later spelled out by President Habibie, in an 
interview with Australian journalists as being: the release 
of Xanana Gusmao (whose sentence would be reduced to 
the time already served), special status for East Timar and 
a reduction in troop presence to the national standard. In 
exchange, Portugal and the UN should recognise integrasi 
and 'the whole world should stop making problems' about 
East Timar. The proposals were immediately rejected by 
Portugal and by Xanana himself in an interview 
smuggled out on video and shown on CNN. He was 
speaking on 20 June, his s2nd birthday, when a 
group of East Timorese were permitted to visit him 
for a birthday celebration. 
East Timor after Suharto 
While the proposals made by Jakarta have failed 
to take the issue forward, the changes in Indonesia 
following Suharto's downfall have certainly had an 
impact in East Timor. The forces of occupation ap-
pear to be under orders not to take action against 
demonstrators, hoping perhaps to make integrasi 
more acceptable to the East Timorese. 
Some changes in Jakarta may have reverbera-
tions in East Timor. Lieutenant-General Prabowo 
Subianto, son-in-law of Suharto, is universally hated 
by the East Timorese as a psychopath who has killed 
or ordered his men to kill with impunity. He rose 
rapidly from the ranks of the special forces, 
KOP ASSUS, to become its commander two years 
ago and has funded and organised youth gangs to 
inform on young activists in the territory. He was 
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also the political mainstay of the present provincial gover-
nor, Abilio Osorio Soares. His swift removal, two days 
after Suharto's downfall, as commander of the army' s 
strategic command, KOSTRAD, in a power struggle with 
armed forces commander-in-chief General Wiranto, has 
removed one of the bleaker aspects of the Indonesian oc-
cupation by clipping the wings of the KOP ASS US troops 
operating there . 
East Timorese demonstrating in London Photo Paul Slattery 
The death of Colonel Salamat Sidabutar, the military 
commander of East Tim or, in a helicopter crash, along with 
half a dozen top military officers in Dili and Bali, may also 
have relieved the pressure. 
The disintegration of the business empire of Suharto 
and his offspring will also halt some projects in East Timor 
where the family has sifted off the cream of investment 
projects. A sugar-cane project owned by Tommy Suharto is 
now reported to have been abandoned. Tens of thousands 
of hectares were seized with the help of Governor Soares, 
forcing many local people from their land: This is likely to 
be one of a number of projects for which the governor will 
be called to account. 
Former Fretilin president Abilio Araujo, who became a 
fervent admirer of Suharto and a business associate of his 
daughter Tutut, will also see his investment plans in East 
Timor go up in smoke. 
The grave economic crisis in Indonesia has borne down 
heavily on Timor. Basic commodities are always dearer in 
East Timor and the discrepancy has hit local consumers 
hard as prices of everything have soared. But the crisis has 
also hit soldiers and their families, with reports of demor-
alisation and of soldiers going absent without leave. It re-
mains to be seen how long Jakarta can afford to fund the 
EASTTIMOR 
occupation at the current level of troops. With 20,000 
troops, the occupation is estimated to cost $1 million a day 
or more. As the coffers run dry, it may soon be difficult for 
the government to pay members of the armed forces and 
civil servants. 
Thousands demonstrate daily 
The East Timorese, however, are using the new situa-
tion to press their demand for self-determination with re-
newed vigour. 
Mass demonstrations have become a daily event in Dili. 
Students at the University of East Timor, UNTIM, held 
free-speech forums despite attempts by the Rector to stop 
them. While uniformed security forces kept a distance, in-
telligence agents - intel - mingled with the crowds and 
some students went into hiding after being intimidated. 
When Governor Abilio Soares convened a meeting of 
politicians and leading personalities in East Timor on 6 
June, it was his intention to garner support for autonomy 
for East Timor within the Republic. Some years ago, he 
tried to sell the idea to Suharto as a sop to the people but 
the dictator would have none of it. 
Far more people turned up for the meeting than had 
been invited, including hundreds of young people who un-
furled banners calling for a referendum and for the release 
of Xanana Gusmao. 
When former governor, Mario Carrascalao, whom 
Soares had asked to chair the meeting, urged people to 
'speak their minds' and to ignore the intel agents who he 
said, were 'toothless' now that Suharto had gone, cheers 
rose to the rafters. Soares, it seems, found himself in a mi-
nority of one as speaker after speaker rose to reject auton-
omy, and to call for a referendum, for the release of 
Xanana Gusmao and for the withdrawal of Indonesian 
troops. Carrascalao later announced that these results 
would be presented to the Habibie government, while 
Soares told a Jakarta daily that he was 'deeply disap-
pointed' with the outcome. 
Meanwhile the security forces were nowhere to be seen, 
having been told no doubt that this was the governor' s 
event and it would not oppose integration. 
On 15 June, 1,500 students from UNTIM and other in-
stitutions went en masse to the local assembly and pre-
sented demands for a referendum and the release of 
Xanana Gusmao to assembly members. They were re-
ceived by the assembly chairperson who promised to pass 
on their demands to Jakarta, reflecting the atmosphere of 
greater openness now that Suharto has been disposed of. 
Young Timorese shot dead 
But East Timorese lives are still cheap for the taking 
and trigger.,happy soldiers are still in the habit of shooting 
people in cold blood. 
On 16 June, a young man was shot dead near Manatuto. 
Herman Dasdores Soares, 21, and a friend, Olandino 
Soares, were shot at without warning, as they were loading 
firewood onto their pick-up truck. Herman was hit twice in 
the stomach and died as he was being transferred from a 
clinic in Manatuto to Dili. When the tragedy was reported 
by the young man's parents to Bishop Belo, the news 
spread rapidly, bringing thousands onto the streets. 
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The army responded fast by apologising for the 
accident' for the first time ever and taking the soldier who 
pulled the trigger into military police custody . The apology 
\\as greeted with contempt while the killing renewed de-
mands for the total withdrawal of Indonesian troops . The 
tragedy only further renewed calls for the military to with-
draw from the territory. 
Xanana Gusmao must take part in talks 
One core demand inside East Timor. in Indonesia and 
abroad is for the release of Xanana Gusmao. along with all 
the scores of Timorese political prisoners now being held. 
Xanana ·s release is \videly seen as being crucial to reach-
ing a solution through negotiations. 
As the students who demonstrated at the Foreign Min-
istry in Jakarta stated in their Petition, the present format of 
UN-sponsored talks involving the foreign ministers of In-
donesia and Portugal is leading nowhere. The format must 
include the resistance leader, alongside East Timer's two 
Nobel Peace laureates, Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta 
in direct talks with Jakarta. 
On a visit to Jakarta soon after Suharto fell from power, 
Britain's Minister of State, Derek Fatchett, representing the 
European Union, visited Xana11a in prison, held a joint 
press conference with him and later called for his release. 
A few days later, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote 
to President Habibie pledging his commitment to the talks 
and calling for the release of all East Timorese political 
prisoners. While not mentioning Xanana by name, the im-
plication was clear. 
In Indonesia, trade union leader, Muchtar Pakpahan, 
one of the first two political prisoners to be released in Ja-
karta, immediately called for Xanana's release. Deputy 
chair of the National Human Rights Commission, Marzuki 
Darusman, has added his voice, saying that most Commis-
sion members support the demand. 
Jakarta's respons,e has been predictable. Foreign Min-
ister A Ii A latas, who has spent most of the past ten years 
defending Indonesia's bankrupt and indefensible p~licy on 
East Timor, repeated the mantra that the East Ttmorese 
leader was convicted on criminal charges and his release 
was 'out of the question' . However, it would be another 
matter, he said, if Portugal and the UN were willing to ac-
cept integration, in which case, Xanana could be free to-
morrow. 
Behind the manoeuvring stand the armed forces. To 
surrender EastTimor would be a huge humiliation but the 
political, diplomatic and economic pressures may soon 
become too powerful for them to resist any longer. 
Prisoner releases a sham 
Following a pledge by Justice Minister Muladi that East 
Timorese prisoners would be released, Habibie ordered the 
release of fifteen political prisoners in Dili. However at 
least six of those released were due to be released anyway 
because they had already served their seven-month sen-
tences. They were all UNTIM students arrested last No-
vember following a clash between demonstrating students 
and the security forces. The others had the charges against 
them dropped, although what the charges were has not 
been revealed. 
Political prisoner lists published on 4 June by Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch included the names 
of 87 East Timorese political prisoners. The two NGOs 
acknowledged that the lists are far from complete and nine 
of the prisoners released by the authorities were not in-
cluded on their lists. 
The six who were released from Becora Prison, Dili, re-
fused to leave the jail for 24 hours, in solidarity with their 
co-prisoners who were not covered by the amnesty. 
Unrest at Becora Prison 
Secora Prison in Dili, which holds convicted East 
Timorese prisoners, has been in a state of ferment. Early in 
June, scores of prisoners became very ill after eating rotten 
fish. Many had to be rushed to hospital for treatment. 
When six of the inmates were released, the farewell be-
came an occasion for protest against the food poisoning 
incident. 
On 20 June, all the prisoners staged a protest against 
their continued incarceration by holding a sit-in on the 
prison forecourt. They unfurled banners and flags calling 
for a referendum and for the release of all East Timorese 
political prisoners, including Xanana Gusmao. They had 
their belongings with them and said they were determined 
to leave the prison. Within half an hour, 15 truckloads of 
the special police, Brimob, arrived to force the prisoners 
back into the prison. The prisoners refused to return to the 
cells for days and faced continued confrontation with Bri-
mob forces. 0 
NEW PUBLICATION: 
EAST TIMOR: OCCUPATION AND RESISTANCE 
Edited by Torben Retb01l 
IWGIA Publication Document 89, June 1998 
288 pp, ISBN 87-984110-7-1 
Order from TAPOL, price: £ 12.00 incl. postage 
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Refugees, prisoners and 'disappeared' in Aceh 
A decision by the UNHCR in June to grant refugee status to 22 Acehnese who took refuge in the 
UNHCR office and the US embassy in Kuala Lumpur is a sharp rebuttal of Indonesian and Malay-
sian refusal to acknowledge that many hundreds of Acehnese now in Malaysia have legitimate cause 
to fear for their safety if forced to return to Indonesia. It highlights the need for legal protection for 
all those still in Malaysia and reinforces fears for those forced to return in March. Meanwhile scores 
of prisoners hope for release while tens of thousands of people remain unaccounted for. 
Since the late 1980s, hundreds, perhaps thousands of 
Acehnese, have fled to Malaysia to escape persecution and 
military operations against the Free Aceh Movement in 
Aceh. Only a handful have been granted residential status. 
Others have tried to make a living without proper docu-
ments, while many have been held in police lock-ups. The 
UN High Commission for Refugees .has been consistently 
denied access to the detainees for the purpose of making a 
determination of their claim to political refugee status. 
Early this year, as the economic crisis hit the Malaysian 
economy, the Malaysian government launched Operation 
Go Away to return home tens of thousands of ' illegal ' In-
donesian migrant labourers. It was under the cover of this 
operation that the Malaysian authorities, under pressure 
from Jakarta, decided to force Acehnese refugees back to 
Aceh and into the hands of their Indonesian persecutors. 
As reported in TAPOL Bulletin No 146, altogether 545 
Acehnese were forcibly repatriated on 26 March. The Ma-
laysian authorities admitted at the time that eight Acehnese 
died during the operation at Semenyih detention camp 
while Acehnese refugee sources in Malaysia believe that 
the death toll was three times as high. 
Now, new light has been shed on the atrocities that ac-
companied the forced repatriations. 
Acehnese poisoned and shot dead 
The targeted Acehnese were being held at four camps, 
Macap Umbo, Lenggeng, Juru and Semenyih. A few hours 
before the operation to empty the camps began, detainees 
at the Macap Umbo camp started vomiting blood and 
fainting after eating the evening meal of rice, dried fish and 
water. When those who had not drunk the water did not 
vomit, the cry went up: 'They are poisoning us. ' Detainees 
at Semenyih also complained that they had· been poisoned. 
One Indonesian who was being held at the camp, later 
told an English journalist: 
'In block after block people were vomiting blood. We 
knew the guards were poisoning us. From 9pm to 4am the 
next day, all the Indonesians were rioting. Then the police 
shot in the air and fired teargas as us, three times. 
'At 5am, 1,800 police from the Federal Reserve Unit 
came to the camp and we were surrounded. They had hel-
mets, guns and whips. The riot finished and the police took 
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'The police beat the Acehnese. Their leader was shot in 
the head. The Acehnese 's friend hit the police sergeant 
with a block of wood. This man was shot in the stomach 
and was killed. A third man went to help the second and he 
was shot in the thigh and was killed. The police took eight 
of the Acehnese away and they were never seen again' 
[John Sweeney in The Observer, 26 April 1998). 
Another witness also confirmed that he had seen three 
men shot dead. 
Regarding the deaths at Semenyih, the Malaysian 
authorities claimed that the police had acted 'in self de-
fence' and that the violence was started by the detainees. 
However, a photograph of police officers prodding the 
dead and injured showed that at least two of the corpses 
were bound hand and foot. The photograph was repro-
duced in our last Bulletin but these horrific details were not 
clear to .us until we saw the same photo reproduced in The 
Observer to illustrate Sweeney's article. 
22 granted refugee status 
Four days after the tragic events on 26 March, fourteen 
Acehnese refugees, driving in a truck, all of whom had 
escaped from the Lenggeng detention camp, crashed 
through the gates of the UNHCR's office in Kuala Lumpur 
and asked for asylum. They were allowed to remain. 
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Then on 10 April, 35 more. all escapees from Lenggeng 
camp. made their way into the French, US and Swiss em-
bassies and a rest-house belonging to the Brunei authorities 
in Kuala Lumpur, also seeking asylum. Only the eight who 
entered the US embassy were allowed to remain. The 
French, Swiss and Brunei embassies called the Malaysian 
police to have the asylum-seekers removed from their 
premises, in gross violation of the provisions of the UN 
Protocol on Refugees . All these governments were criti-
cised for such a blatant violation of the UN Protocol on 
Refugees. Shamelessly, French embassy staff are quoted in 
one report as saying that the refugees looked weak and frail 
and were in no condition to resist when the Malaysian riot 
police, armed with batons came for them. No wonder they 
were in such a state. They had been in hiding for two 
weeks already, after escaping from the horror camp. 
Acehnese in the UNHCR compound in Kuala Lumpur 
Political asylum granted 
On 11 June, it was announced in Kuala Lumpur that all 
the twenty-two Acehnese taking refuge on UNHCR and 
US premises had been granted political refugee status and 
would be found third-country asylum in due course. 'The 
commission has studied the cases and decided they are po-
litical refugees and not economic migrants, therefore war-
ranting political asylum', US embassy information officer 
James Warren told the Malaysian daily The Sun (11 June]. 
The other 27 who had been re-arrested by the Malay-
sian police were still in custody. The UNHCR made it 
known that they were seeking the permission of the Malay-
sian government to meet the Acehnese with a view to con-
sidering their request for asylum, 
This suggests that many if not all of those forcibly 
returned to Indonesia or still held in lock-ups would also 
have been eligible but were denied their rights by the 
Malaysian, French, Swiss and Brunei authorities. 
Fate of the returnees 
As for the 545 forced back to Indonesia, they were 
taken straight to Rancong detention centre, a centre run .by 
the special forces unit, Kopkamtib, where prisoners are 
known in the past to have been severely tortured or mal-
treated. 
Once back in Indonesian custody, it became very diffi-
cult to monitor their circumstances as access was denied to 
journalists and to relatives. At the request of the UNHCR, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
sought and were eventually granted permission to visit the 
returnees on 20 April. By that time, however, many of the 
prisoners had been dispersed to other locations or allowed 
to return home while being kept under strict military su-
pervision. 
ICRC prison visits to Aceh had been suspended i.n 
March 1997 so this was the agency's first visit to the re-
gion in more than a year. In effect, this means that no 
agencies, domestic or foreign, are monitoring the condi-
tions of the scores of political prisoners in Aceh, let alone 
the prisoners just returned from Malaysia. Nothing is 
known about ICRC's findings as these would only be made 
known to the Indonesian authorities and presumably also to 
the UNHCR. 
Jailed and 'disappeared' 
Acehnese 
Of the known political prisoners in 
Indonesia listed by Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch on 4 
June (not including East Timorese 
prisoners), about one third are 
Acehnese, a total of 55. Most are 
serving extremely heavy sentences, 
upwards of ten years and almost all 
were charged under the anti-subversion 
act. In the various statements issued so 
far by members of the Habibie cabinet 
regarding the release of political pris-
oners, not a word has been said about 
these Acehnese prisoners. 
In June, two women went to Jakarta 
from Aceh to lobby about their hus-
. bands. Ibu Mauizah's husband, Hasbi 
Abdullah, a lecturer at Syiah University in Banda Aceh, 
was sentenced to nine years in 1994. She said he and others 
arrested with him had been tortured to confess that they 
were involved in the Free Aceh Movement. She wants her 
husband to be released without delay. Cut Ima Keumala's 
husband, Mahdi Yusuf, is one of many thousands of 
Acehnese who have disappeared since 1990. She said he 
was taken from home by Second Lieutenant S. Thamrin 
and two other soldiers in October 1990 and has never been 
heard of since. 
Emboldened by the actions of these two women, a 
group of women from the sub-district of Mutiara, Pidie 
district in Aceh, have started campaigning openly to de-
mand information of the whereabouts of their husbands. A 
report in the Banda Aceh daily, Serambi [23 June], lists the 
names of twelve men who were taken from their homes 
over a period of more than a year, from March 1997 until 
March 1998. None has been heard of since. In most cases, 
the abductors drove up in grey or dark coloured vehicle.s 
that were often seen driving around villages. When abduc-
tions occurred in the night, the village electricity was cut 
off so that it was impossible to read the number plates. 
After first taking their complaints to the local legal aid 
institute, they then went to the regional assembly. 'We only 
hope that our husbands will be returned. If they are dead, 
please let us know where their graves are, why they were 
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arrested and what they were guilty of,' said Nyak Ubit, one 
of the women. 
Lawyers in the region say that more and more women 
are coming forward to demand information about lost hus-
bands or sons who have been abducted. 
One human rights organisation in Aceh believes that 
there are no fewer than 39,000 women who were widowed 
following disappearances during the four years of military 
operations from 1989 unti I 1993. For years, no one dared 
to speak publicly about these 'disappearances' for fear of 
being branded 'GPK' or 'security disrupter gangs' as the 
opponents of Indonesian rule in Aceh, West Papua and 
East Timor are known. Now with the change of govern-
ment in Jakarta, they have begun to speak out. 
Woman detainee severely tortured 
Meanwhile, an Acehnese woman who was arrested in 
April and held for two months is now known to have been 
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badly tortured during her incarceration. 
Cut Sari, 30, was involved in helping workers who 
were seeking employment in Malaysia. She was taken into 
custody shortly after the forced repatriation of the 545 
Acehnese from Malaysia but no charges were brought and 
the reasons for her arrest are not clear. No arrest warrant 
was ever issued during the two months she spent in the 
custody of the security forces in Arun, Sigli in the district 
of Pidie. What is clear however, is that she was so badly 
tortured that her husband could hardly recognise her when 
she returned home because her face was covered in swel-
lings and bruises. She also had a number of injuries on her 
body and was in need of hospital treatment. 
The YPBHI, a human rights organisation in Sumatra, 
has lodged a strong protest with the government at the way 
she was treated. $ 
Acehnese want region demilitarised 
Since the downfall of Suharto, a movement for an end to militarisation has swept the province of 
Aceh. The people of Aceh have a proud history of resistance against the Dutch at the end of the last 
century. Since independence, dissatisfaction with control from Jakarta spawned an Islamic move-
ment in the 1950s and later the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Since the late 1980s, thousands of 
lives have been lost and thousands of people are unaccounted/or. Women who have been widowed 
are playing a prominent role in the demand for change. 
Aceh is one of two regions in Indonesia that has been 
granted 'special status', which is supposed to be a designa-
tion of privilege granting local people rights over religious 
affairs and educational matters. But in 1980, special status 
took on a different meaning when the province was de-
clared to be a daerah operasi militer (DOM) or military 
operational area, the army alleging that this was the only 
way it could be protected from the GPK, the regime's way 
of referring to the Free Aceh Movement. As a result, for 
decades, the people of Aceh have been subjected to inten-
sive surveillance, road-blocks, curfews, raids and arrests. 
In addition, Aceh's DOM status in reality has provided the 
cover for government officials and military personnel to 
engage in systematic corruption. 
It is worth pointing out that the offer of 'special status' 
for East Timor is invariably linked to Aceh as an example 
of a region that 'enjoys' such a status. What this means in 
practice is a special role for ABRI, the Indonesian armed 
forces. 
Local NGOs and many sections of the community are 
also calling for the release of political prisoners and for 
investigations into the thousands of 'disappear~d' and other 
human rights abuses for which they hold the military re-
sponsible. [Also see separate item.] 
Campaign to end DOM 
The demand for the withdrawal of DOM has the sup-
port of people from all walks of life. Besides the physical 
and psychological impact of army repression, militarisation 
has put off many potential investors who fear the prospect 
of having to rely on the military for everything, which al-
ways means plenty of bribes 
Hundreds of religious leaders have backed the demand 
and even the leader of the provincial assembly, H.T. Djo-
han, wrote to the armed forces commander-in-chief saying 
it was time for DOM to end. 
On 6 June, six students from several universities in 
Banda Aceh went on hunger strike, saying that they would 
not end their action until the authorities had agreed to 
withdraw DOM. The students, whose number swelled to 
thirteen, refused to take food and would only drink water. 
Some students were forced to give up as they grew faint, 
but others took their place. They have received a great deal 
of moral and material support not only from the general 
public but from government officials, NGO activists and 
students from as far afield as Medan, North Sumatra, 
Lampung, South Sumatra, Jakarta and Bandung. 
The response of the army and local government offi-
cials to this demand has been less than encouraging. Army 
chief-of-staff, General Subagyo Hadisiswoyo would only 
say that ABRI would meet with local government leaders 
'to consider the request'. A few days earlier, on 11 June, 
the National Human Rights Commission and the governor 
of Aceh· had told the students to end their action as their 
demand was under consideration, but they refused to do so. 
Lt.General Fachrul Razi, ABRI chief of staff for gen-
eral affairs, said that if DOM were withdrawn, 'the people 
of Aceh would have to take responsibility for their own 
security', adding cynically that the 'GPK would return and 
the students would have to be given weapons to deal with 
them'. [Waspada, 10 June] The next day, Major-General 
Ismed Yuzairi, regional military commander, declared that 
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"the withdrawal of DOM is completely out of the ques-
tion· . [ Jraspada , l I June] 
Corruption 
As in other regions throughout Indonesia, corruption is 
now a key target of local protest and the main focus of the 
protest is the provincial governor, Syamsuddin Mahmud. 
When his five-year term came to an end recently, there 
were widespread calls for him not to be re-appointed. He 
stands accused of buying the votes of a number of mem-
bers of the provincial assembly to guarantee his re-election. 
This secured him a majority in the assembly but the leader 
of the assembly has warned that he would be pressing for a 
police investigation of this case of bribery. Other corrup-
tion scandals involving the governor include the construc-
tion of the Harapan Bangsa sports stadium, the manage-
ment of a local bank and various aspects of local govern-
ment funding. [Serambi, 5 June] 
Syamsuddin 's installation for a second term was much 
delayed because of the strength of feeling against him but it 
finally went ahead on 19 June. Soon afterwards, the stu-
dents on hunger strike declared that if he failed to support 
the demand for the withdrawal of DOM within a week, 
they would intensify their action by refusing to take water 
as well as food. 
Calls for Interior Minister to resign 
The fact that it was the Minister for the Interior, 
Lt.General Syarwan Hamid, who swore the governor in 
added insult to injury. 
Several NGOs in Aceh have been demanding that 
President Habibie sack Syarwan Hamid because he was 
responsible for scores of atrocities during his tour of duty 
as a military commander in Aceh. According to the Aceh-
based YPBHI, the Foundation for Education and Human 
Rights, more than a hundred people were murdered or dis-
appeared in the sub-district of Peulak alone during the time 
this man was military commander of the district military 
command of North Aceh from 1990 until 1994. Local peo-
ple hold him responsible for these atrocities. • 
Atrocities and famine leave scores dead 
Eleven villagers were killed, shot or stabbed to death, many more were wounded and scores died 
from hunger an.d disease durin~ Indonesian army operations aimed at flushing out OPM fighters 
allegedly operating east of the giant copper-and-gold mine run by Freeport and Rio Tinto. The mili-
tary operations followed in the wake of the release of hostages held/or four months in 1996. 
The atrocities were documented in a report presented to 
the National Human Rights Commission on 25 May 1998 
by the leaders of two Protestant churches and the Catholic 
church in Mimika. It reveals that villagers were driven 
from their villages and prevented from returning by a 
heavy military presence. Many of those killed or wounded 
were shot in cold blood by troops when visiting their gar-
dens in search of food. Unable to tend their gardens, the 
villagers were struck down by famine and disease, which 
resulted in at least 126 deaths. 
Scores of houses and churches were burned down, as 
reported by church activists who visited the region on three 
occasions from August 1997 till April this year. The 
monitors found army posts everywhere. Intimidated by the 
army ' s presence, more than a thousand villagers from one 
of the co.ngregations fled and hid in forests or caves. A way 
from their gardens, they suffered hunger and malnutrition. 
The military operations which resulted in such heavy 
loss of life were aimed at hunting down members of the 
OPM and protecting the Freeport-Rio Tinto mine, now 
called a 'vital project' and enjoying special protection by 
the armed forces. 
The atrocities occurred in and around five villages lo-
cated in the concession area of the Freeport/Rio Tinto 
mine, Bela, Alama, Jila, Mapnduma and Ngeselama, the 
area where hostages were held by the OPM, the Free Papua 
Movement, from January till May 1996. 
The region has since been closed by the army; even to 
church leade~s. Last year, church leaders in Jayapura, 
asked the National Human Rights Commission to persuade 
the army to give them access, but their pleas were ignored. 
Shot in cold blood 
_Most of the eleven killed were shot when returning to 
thetr gardens. Here are details of a few of these murders: 
. Marthen Kemong, 16, left his refuge with some 
fnends to see whether it was safe to go to the family gar-
den. They found it occupied by troops and fled, but 
Marthen got entangled in vegetation and fell. As he 
emerged, he was shot and killed. His body was thrown off 
a cliff where it was found five days later by his friends. 
Zakari Katagame, 14, had managed, with friends, to 
collect food from their garden. On the way back to their 
refuge, they stopped to cook the food. Kopassus troops 
approached them and opened fire. Zakari was hit in the 
~ead. The others escap_ed the hail of bullets. The troops had 
JUSt spread leaflets urgmg people to return to their villages. 
On the way back to their garden, Ninuor Kwalik, 50, 
and Daugunme Kwalik, 12, passed a deserted military 
post full of food. They returned with friends to take the 
food but troops were nearby. The two were shot dead in a 
hail of bullets while others were packing the food. 
Marinos Deikmom, 16, had returned to his family's 
garden with friends. While outside the fence, Marinus was 
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shot and killed. Those inside managed to flee. Marinus' 
body was later found half buried, near the fence. 
Ikadius Deikmom, 20, was shot at close range near his 
family's garden. The force of the gunfire blew off his head. 
His body was covered with leaves and abandoned. It was 
later found and buried by relatives. 
Pastor Wenesobuk Nggiwijangge, 48, left his church 
on 12 October 1997 to check whether a trap he had laid 
had caught a tree kangaroo, but ran into two soldiers. A 
struggle ensued and he was thrown into a pit and shot dead. 
The sound of gunfire was heard in nearby Mapnduma. 
Later relatives went searching for him. Soldiers said 
they had not seen him but a little further on, there were 
signs of a struggle. Two soldiers order them to leave or be 
shot as members of the OPM. About 200 people went back 
again and found his body stripped naked and covered with 
gunshot, knife and stab wounds. The villagers were later 
told by soldiers to say the pastor had died a natural death. 
-. 
Hamlets and churches destroyed 
The report documents the razing of hamlets in Bela and 
Alama. In every hamlet, the investigators found houses and 
churches in ruins, torn down to make way for army posts 
or used for firewood. Witnesses told them: 
As soon as soldiers entered and took over a hamlet, 
they began shooting indiscriminately, causing people to 
flee for safety to caves or jungles near their homes. From 
there, they witnessed their homes and churches being de-
stroyed or burnt, one by one, until their hamlets were a sea 
of fire. They also tore down clinics, used the roofing for 
firewood, as well as taking the belongings inside. 
The buildings destroyed included thirteen churches, 166 
houses, 29 mens' houses, one honai and two clinics. 
Scores of villagers died from famine-related diseases 
after being separated from their gardens because of the 
military operations. At least 15 villagers from Bela and 
Alama died while in hiding and eighteen more died after 
returning home in December 1997. This year, the death 
rate has risen. From January to March, 28 more died and in 
April, another 65 were reported dead. 
Armed forces must be called to account 
A statement by the Irian Jaya Human Rights Concern 
Group stressed that the Indonesian armed forces, ABRI, 
must take responsibility for the tragedy. It called for the 
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court-martial of five senior army officers: Brigadier-
General (now Lt.General) Prabowo Subianto, who com-
manded the operation to free the hostages, along with his 
deputy, Brigadier-General Gasing. Prabowo, son-in-law of 
Suharto, was recently removed as commander of the stra-
tegic army command, Kostrad, in a power struggle with 
General Wiranto, ABRI commander-in-chief. The others 
were the two former military commanders of Irian Jaya, 
Major-General Dunidja, and Major-General Johnny Lti-
mintang, and Colonel Franz de Wana, district military 
commander in Manokwari, and J.B. Wenas, also an army 
man, district head of Jayawijaya. 
It demanded the immediate withdrawal of all troops 
from the five villages and from the central highlands. 
Freeport must end mining operations 
As for the mining giant that has been exploiting the re-
gion since 1968, the Group said that its presence in the 
country was a threat · to the native inhabitants and had 
caused many deaths. The company was financing the army 
to protect its mining operations which had led to the 
atrocities. The Freeport contract of work had been signed 
during the Suharto regime and should therefore be 
scrapped. The Suharto family had profited ·from its opera-
tions whereas local inhabitants whose land had been seized 
had not felt any benefits. 
· The Group also called on the UN to conduct an investi-
gation into the abuses, given that past experience of inves-
tigations by the National Human Rights Commission had 
been far from satisfactory, But the Group, w_hich published 
its demands during a demonstration in Jayapura on 29 
May, challenged the Commission to send a fact-finding 
mission to the region without delay. 
It is essential, the Group said, for the region to be ac-
cessible to outsiders and for villagers to be allowed free-
dom of movement to till their gardens and to hunt. 
International Red Cross called to account 
The Groups also said that the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) must take responsibility for al-
lowing a helicopter to be used to transport troops who 
landed in Mapnduina while the hostage crisis was still un-
derway and attacked villagers in Mapnduma. This tragic 
incident occurred on 9 May 1996 when troops landed in 
Mapnduma in a helicopter bearing ICRC insignia and shot 
at villagers who mistook the aircraft for a Red Cross trans-
port. This incident which is believed to have resulted in a 
number of deaths has never been investigated. 
National Commission visits Timika 
Following demonstrations in Jayapura by the Human 
Rights Concern Group, the National Human Rights Com-
mission sent two Commission members to Timika on 11 
June. After visiting Jila and Bela and speaking to wit.: 
nesses, seeing graves and burnt churches, they agreed that 
many atrocities had occurred. They decided to send a 
larger mission which returned to the central highlands two 
weeks later. • 
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POLITICAL PRISONERS 
Political prisoner releases stalled 
One of the very first pledges to emerge from President Habibie's 'Reform' Cabinet was that Indone-
sian political prisoners would be released. Justice Minister Muladi made so many statements on the 
matter that it really seemed as if we were entering a new era. After a month, however, only four pris-
oners have been released. 
There are numerous categories of political prisoners 
held under a variety of laws and in connection with a 
whole range of 'political crimes'. The lists read like a rich 
mosaic of all the political groups and ideologies which the 
dictator saw as grave threats to the stability of his regime. 
The 1965 prisoners 
The longest-serving political prisoners are the thirteen 
men held for alleged involvement in the October 1965 al-
leged coup attempt which brought Suharto to power and in 
which he has been implicated. Five of these men have been 
living under the shadow of death sentences since the late 
1960s. The others are all serving life sentences which Su-
harto, vengeful to the end, refused to change to fixed-term 
sentences that would have enabled their release. 
Many pleas have been made on behalf of these men on 
humanitarian grounds. They are all elderly, frail and suf-
fering from physical or psychological disorders. In August 
1996, Amnesty International published a list of fourteen 
names in a report entitled: The 1965 Prisoners: How Many 
More Will Die in Jail? It recorded the recent death of one 
1965 prisoner. Since then, Sukatno, who was described as 
seriously ill has also died. 
Habibie, like Suharto, has closed his ears to these pleas. 
Justice Minister Muladi who, until his appointment, was a 
member of the National Human Rights Commission, also 
cannot bring himself to release these men and has specifi-
cally excluded them from any amnesties he says the gov-
ernment is contemplating. The anti-communist phobia still 
runs deep, proof if any were needed that not much has 
changed. As Habibie said, 'all political prisoners will 
eventually be released unless they are Marxists or Commu-
nists'. [Jakarta Post, 28 May] 
Party or union prisoners 
A number of the people incarcerated by Suharto had 
had the temerity to defy his corporatist system and set up 
independent parties or unions. On 26 May, two high-
profile prisoners were released to great media attention. 
They were: Sri·Bintang Pamungkas, chair of PUDI, the 
Indonesian Democratic Unity Party, and Muchtar Pakpa-
han, chair of SBSI, the Indonesian Prosperity Labour Un-
ion. · Both were already serving sentences under earlier 
convictions and were being tried on new charges, but were 
granted amnesties. A few days later, Nuku Suleiman, 
chair of the reform group PIJAR, and Andi Syahputra 
convicted for helping to print the newsletter of the inde-
pendent journalists alliance, AJI, were released. Since then, 
the releases have stalled. [See separate article about East 
Timor releases.] 
The twelve members of the People's Democratic Party, 
the PRD, or its affiliates who were put behind bars by Su-
harto on anti-subversion charges, have been branded as the 
reincarnation of the outlawed communist party. Their po-
litical programme was dedicated to the establishment of a 
multi-party political system which is what is now coming 
int~ being. Without massive pressure at home and abroad, 
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